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Can Congress Regulate Intrastate
Endangered Species Under the
Commerce Clause?
THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS OVER WHETHER THE
REGULATED ACTIVITY IS PRIVATE COMMERCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OR THE TAKING OF PROTECTED
SPECIES*
Bradford C. Mank'
I. INTRODUCTION
In enacting the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA)' to
protect a wide range of endangered and threatened species,
Congress primarily relied on its authority under the Commerce
Clause.' From 1937 until 1995, the Supreme Court applied a
very lenient rational basis standard for reviewing
congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause.3 Under
© 2004 Bradford C. Mank. All Rights Reserved.
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16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).
2 See infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604-09 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Lopez majority for claiming to use but failing to follow
deferential rational basis review used by the Court since 1937); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281-83 (1981) (approving under
Commerce Power federal regulation of intrastate mining activities under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 to prevent ruinous competition among
states likely to lead to inadequate environmental standards); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding use of Commerce Power to
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that highly deferential rational basis, the Court would almost
certainly have approved the constitutionality of the ESA.4
However, since 1995, the Court has applied a more stringent
approach in United States v. Morrison5 and United States v.
Lopez,6  rejecting two federal statutes as exceeding
congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce.7 A
number of commentators have observed that Morrison and
Lopez raise serious questions about whether Congress has
authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate either purely
intrastate species or those with insignificant commercial
worth.' Many endangered or threatened species, about half,
enact civil rights legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in public
accommodations); Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name:
Lopez, Morrison, SWANCC, and Gibbs, Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), Apr. 2001, at
10413, 10413 (discussing highly deferential standard of review in Commerce Clause
cases from 1937 until 1995); Bradford C. Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened
Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional State Authority and
Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 735-36 (2002)
(same); Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power
and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1216-19
(2003) (same); Eric Brignac, The Commerce Clause Justification of Federal Endangered
Species Protection: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 79 N.C. L. REV. 873, 874, 883 (2001) ("After the
Court's decision in NLRB [v. Jones in 1937], the Commerce Clause was a virtual blank
check that Congress could use to pass almost any legislation."); Omar N. White, The
Endangered Species Act's Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the
Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215, 235 (2000) (same); infra
notes 135, 201 and accompanying text.
4 See Mank, supra note 3, at 792 (arguing 1973 ESA clearly meets rational
basis standard for advancing commercial interests under the Commerce Clause).
5 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
6 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
See infra notes 151-212 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., Mank, supra note 3, at 723-27 & passim (arguing Lopez and
Morrison involve significant issues regarding whether Congress has the authority to
regulate endangered species that lack significant commercial value or exist in only one
state); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-
Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998) (arguing Lopez raises serious questions about
whether Congress has the authority to regulate endangered species that lack
significant commercial value); White, supra note 3, at 217-18 (observing Lopez raises
questions about authority of Congress to regulate species with little commercial value).
If the Supreme Court struck down the Endangered Species Act as exceeding
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, Congress and the President might be
able to achieve some level of protection through the Constitution's treaty power, but
that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (treaty
power); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating treaties are "supreme Law of the Land" and binding on
states); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 430-35 (1920) (upholding treaty between
United States and Great Britain, on behalf of Canada, to protect migratory birds);
White, supra note 3, at 224-34 (discussing possible use of treaty power to protect
endangered species). Undoubtedly, some endangered or threatened species such as the
bald eagle or grizzly bear have enough commercial value from tourism or medicinal
value to satisfy even a narrow interpretation of the commerce power. See Nagle, supra,
at 184-86.
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have habitats limited to one state.' Most endangered or
threatened species limited to one state have little economic
value in interstate commerce." Furthermore, many threatened
and endangered species that cross state lines lack significant
commercial value and, therefore, even their regulation under
the ESA may present significant Commerce Clause issues."
Ruling on the ESA in the Spring of 2003, both the Fifth
and the District of Columbia Circuits held that Congress has
the authority under the Commerce Clause to protect solely
intrastate endangered or threatened species from the harms
stemming from the development of private lands. The two
circuits, however, used completely opposite reasoning to reach
the same result. On March 26, 2003, the Fifth Circuit in GDF
Realty Investments v. Norton2 rejected the government's
argument that the economic impact of the commercial
development regulated under the statute was the appropriate
focus of the recent Supreme Court test, namely, whether the
statute regulates activities having a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. Instead, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
intrastate spiders and beetles, which have no economic impact
by themselves, do have substantial impacts on interstate
commerce when their impacts are aggregated with the impacts
of all other protected species, and that aggregation of all
endangered species is appropriate because of the
"interdependence of all species.
9 See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (observing that 521 of 1082 species in United States listed as endangered or
threatened in 1997 were found in only one state). One commentator has questioned
whether intrastate endangered species necessarily raise greater Commerce Clause
issues than some species that live in more than one state, but lack significant
commercial value. See Nagle, supra note 8, at 185-86 n.49 ("Why the fact that a bird or
animal crosses state lines of its own volition and without being itself an object of
interstate commerce is sufficient for Commerce Clause purposes remains
unexplained."). Both judges and commentators, however, have suggested that
exclusively intrastate species raise the most difficult issues under the Commerce
Clause. See Mank, supra note 3, at 751-53 (disagreeing with Professor Nagle that
distinction between interstate and intrastate species has no legal significance).
10 See Mank, supra note 3, at 725; Nagle, supra note 8, at 182 (discussing
several intrastate endangered species with no known commercial or recreational
value).
. See Mank, supra note 3, at 725, 753; Nagle, supra note 8, at 186 (arguing
many endangered species have little commercial value); Brignac, supra note 3, at 883
(same).
12 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, No. 01-51099, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3933 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2004) (en banc) [hereinafter GDF].
13 Id. at 640. See infra notes 416-26 and accompanying text.
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By contrast, on April 1, 2003, in Rancho Viejo LLC v.
Norton (Viejo)," the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the
reasoning that the Fifth Circuit had explicitly rejected,
concluding that the "regulated activity is Rancho Viejo's
planned commercial development, not the arroyo toad that it
threatens."'5 In a footnote, without citing GDF, the District of
Columbia Circuit stated that it did not "mean to discredit
rationales that other circuits have relied upon in upholding
endangered species legislation."'6 On July 22, 2003, the District
of Columbia Circuit by a seven-to-two vote denied Rancho
Viejo's request for a rehearing en banc."7 In separate dissenting
opinions from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judges Sentelle
and Roberts each cited GDF in arguing that the three-judge
panel decision was inconsistent with recent Supreme Court
Commerce Clause decisions because it inappropriately focused
on the commercial development rather than on the toad.'
The differences in the rationales of the GDF and Viejo
courts are significant because they affect the scope of which
types of projects the ESA may regulate. If a court focuses on
the ESA's means in regulating the economic impact of the
activities that harm endangered species, then the government
likely can regulate large scale construction projects, but not a
lone hiker walking through a forest or perhaps even individual
homeowners, although in the aggregate both types of activities
could cause significant harm to these species.'9 Indeed, Chief
Judge Ginsburg in his concurring opinion in Viejo stated:
Our rationale is that, with respect to a species that is not an article
in interstate commerce and does not affect interstate commerce, a
take can be regulated if - but only if - the take itself substantially
affects interstate commerce. The large-scale residential development
that is the take in this case clearly does affect interstate commerce.
Just as important, however, the lone hiker in the woods, or the
1 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
" Id. at 1072.
10 Id. at 1067 n.2.
17 Rancho Viejo LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert.
denied, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1652 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Viejo].
"' Id. at 1158-60 (Sentelle, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc);
id. at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
'9 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 189-91, 208-15 (discussing choice of activity
problem under Endangered Species Act of 1973 and arguing courts should limit statute
to commercial activities that destroy endangered species or their habitat).
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homeowner who moves dirt in order to landscape his property,
though he takes the toad, does not affect interstate commerce. 0
By contrast, under the rationale of GDF, the government could
regulate a lone hiker or landscaping homeowner who harms
any endangered species, no matter how insignificant, because
the loss of any endangered species threatens the delicate
balance of ecosystems, and harm to ecosystems would cause
substantial harms to interstate commerce.'
The disagreement between the Fifth and District of
Columbia Circuits is understandable because the Supreme
Court's recent decisions do not provide clear answers to how
courts should analyze legislation under the Commerce Clause,
especially regarding how to distinguish between commercial
activities within the scope of the commerce power and non-
commercial activities outside Congress's authority.22 In 1995,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez,' a five-to-four
decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that a federal
statute regulating intrastate gun possession near local schools
exceeded Congress's power because the Gun-Free School Zones
Act (GFSZA) regulated activities that did not substantially
affect interstate commerce.24 The Court stated, "the possession
of a gun in a school zone... has nothing to do with 'commerce'
or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might
define those terms."" In 2000, in United States v. Morrison,2' a
five-to-four decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
involving a split among exactly the same justices who had
20 Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1080 (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring). The majority opinion
in Viejo suggested that the lone hiker might be subsumed within the statute's broader
purposes, but declined to answer the question because the facts of the case involved a
substantial commercial housing development and not a lone hiker. Id. at 1077-78; see
also infra notes 333-35, 441 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 416-26 and accompanying text. Undoubtedly, some
endangered or threatened species such as the bald eagle or grizzly bear have enough
commercial value from tourism or medicinal value to satisfy even a narrow
interpretation of the commerce power. See Nagle, supra note 8, at 184-86.
22 See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1202, 1204-05, 1228, 1258-60(arguing Lopez and Morrison fail to clarify which types of commercial activities are
within scope of Commerce Clause and give courts too much discretion to decide scope of
commerce power); Gil Seinfeld, The Possibility of Pretext Analysis in Commerce Clause
Adjudication, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251, 1276-87 (2003) (discussing difficulties
lower courts have encountered in distinguishing economic from non-economic
activities).
23 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
24 Id. at 559-63.
25 Id. at 560-61.
26 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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disagreed in Lopez,27 the Court held that a federal statute
penalizing intrastate gender-based violence fell outside the
commerce power because the law regulated activities that were
essentially non-economic in nature.n The Court struck down
the statute even though Congress had made explicit findings in
the statute regarding the economic impacts of gender-based
violence on interstate commerce.' While the cases reflect a
more narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause, it is
unclear how far the Court in Lopez and Morrison intended to
repudiate prior decisions. Numerous commentators have
speculated regarding the extent to which the reasoning in
Lopez and Morrison could be used to invalidate other
legislation based on the Commerce Clause, but there are few
clear answers to how courts should distinguish between
economic and non-economic activities."
A more recent Supreme Court decision only raises
further questions about how closely related the commercial
activities must be to the regulated entities for the commercial
activity to justify legislation under the Commerce Clause. In
2001, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),3' the Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) claimed jurisdiction under the 1972 Federal
Water Pollution Control Act 32 (FWPCA) to regulate isolated,
intrastate seasonal ponds that provided habitats for migratory
birds. The landowner challenged the regulation both on the
ground that the Corps exceeded its statutory authority by
regulating isolated waters, or, alternatively, that Congress
exceeded its Commerce Clause power by seeking to regulate
27 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 600. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer again dissented. Id.
28 Id. at 613-19. The Court also held that Congress lacked authority under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act, 42
U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994), but that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. Id. at 619-
27; see also A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 328 (2001).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614.
30 See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1202, 1204-05, 1228, 1258-60
(arguing Lopez and Morrison fail to clarify which types of commercial activities are
within scope of Commerce Clause and give courts too much discretion to decide scope of
commerce power); Seinfeld, supra note 22, at 1276-87 (discussing difficulties lower
courts have encountered in distinguishing economic from non-economic activities).
31 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
32 See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(2000).
[Vol. 69:3
2004] REGULATING INTRASTATE ENDANGERED SPECIES 929
such waters. The Court avoided the constitutional issue by
narrowly interpreting the statute to exclude isolated waters,
concluding that Congress intended the statute to apply only to
navigable waters. In dicta, however, the Court suggested that a
broader reading of the statute would have raised significant
concerns under the Commerce Clause because land use
regulation is a traditional area of local government control.3
The Corps had initially relied on the commercial value
of the migratory birds as justifying congressional regulation of
the isolated, intrastate waters that provided habitat for the
birds, but late in the appellate process the government also
contended that the commercial value of the projects causing
harm to the waters was another basis for finding substantial
impacts on interstate commerce.' The SWANCC Court
suggested in dicta that the commercial activities were too far
removed from the statute's "object" of regulating "navigable
waters."" The GDF court read this dicta in SWANCC as casting
doubt upon the viability of predicating Commerce Clause
regulation on the commercial activity that harms wildlife. 6
Unfortunately, SWANCC itself failed to provide a clear answer
about how lower courts should decide what is the central
"object" of a statute - either the statute's regulatory "targets"
or its beneficiaries - and how close the relationship must be
between the object of the statute and the commercial purposes
of the Commerce Clause. 7
Because the Lopez and Morrison decisions do not clearly
define the categories of commercial activities that Congress
may regulate or the appropriate boundaries of federalism,
there is no simple answer to whether lower courts determining
the constitutionality of the ESA should focus on the commercial
activities that may harm the endangered species or on the
commercial impacts of the endangered species themselves.3
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (citing Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) ('[R]egulation of land use [is] a function
traditionally performed by local governments.")).
3 Id. at 173.
35 Id.
" See GDF, 326 F.3d 622, 633-35 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, No. 01-51099,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3933 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2004) (en banc); infra notes 385-88 and
accompanying text.
37 Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1227-28, 1248-49 (arguing SWANCC
fails to clarify whether the targets or beneficiaries of regulatory statute are its 'object"
and which types of commercial activities are within scope of Commerce Clause).
38 See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1202, 1204-05, 1228, 1258-60
(arguing Lopez and Morrison fail to clarify which types of commercial activities are
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Nevertheless, Viejo's commercial activities approach is
arguably both over- and under-inclusive. It is potentially over-
inclusive because the government could regulate any non-
commercial intrastate objects, such as toads, that are affected
by a large interstate commercial enterprise, such as building
construction, even if the intrastate objects do not substantially
affect interstate commerce, and even if they do fall within a
traditional area of state regulation. Thus, as the GDF court
argued, under the commercial activities approach, the statutes
in Lopez and Morrison would be constitutional if the violator
was engaged in commercial activities that affected interstate
commerce, but, as the GDF decision convincingly
demonstrated, that result would contradict the holdings in
those two cases. 9 Furthermore, a broad reading of the
commercial activities rationale would arguably allow the
federal government to usurp local and state regulation of non-
commercial, intrastate activities, such as protection of wildlife,
solely because non-regulated conduct by an actor, such as
commercial development, has some connection to interstate
commerce. This result would be achieved at the expense of
federalism principles that require state or local regulatory
control over non-commercial, intrastate activities. ' ° On the
other hand, Viejo's commercial activities approach is arguably
under-inclusive because in the aggregate, lone hikers,
landscaping homeowners, or off-road enthusiasts may harm a
significant number of endangered species, but without the
"hook" of large-scale, commercial activity, they cannot be
regulated at all.4
The GDF court's approach of aggregating all
endangered and threatened species regardless of their
commercial value might seem questionable in light of Lopez
and Morrison's emphasis that the Commerce Clause is
generally limited to regulating activities that have significant
economic impacts on interstate commerce. Nevertheless, there
is a rational basis for Congress's assumption in the ESA that it
is necessary to preserve all endangered species to avoid serious
within scope of Commerce Clause and give courts too much discretion to decide scope of
commerce power); Seinfeld, supra note 22, at 1276-87 (discussing difficulties lower
courts have encountered in distinguishing economic from non-economic activities).
39 See GDF, 326 F.3d at 635; see also infra notes 389-95 and accompanying
text.
40 See GDF, 326 F.3d at 634-35 (rejecting the commercial activities approach
later used in Viejo); infra notes 385-91 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 438-40 and accompanying text.
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potential losses to interstate commerce, and neither Lopez nor
Morrison purported to demand more than such a rational basis
to justify legislation once the connection to commerce is
established.4' The GDF court convincingly concluded that there
is such a strong interdependency among all species and
ecosystems that the loss of any endangered species must be
avoided to prevent harm to interstate commerce.4 ' Accordingly,
the GDF court correctly determined that protecting
commercially insignificant endangered species is an essential
component of a larger regulatory scheme that is valid under
the Commerce Clause." Furthermore, from an environmental
policy standpoint, GDF's aggregate approach of considering the
impact of all endangered and threatened species provides more
protection to these species than the approach used in Viejo.45
The crucial difference between the GDF and Viejo
decisions is that the former focused on the endangered species
themselves while the latter emphasized that the ESA regulates
commercial activities that affect such species. There is some
support in the ESA for either approach because the statute
suggests that both commercial activities that harm species and
the species themselves affect interstate commerce.
However, the Lopez and Morrison decisions, as well as
dicta in SWANCC, imply that courts must determine a
statute's central regulatory objective in determining whether
the activities it regulates are the type of commercial activities
within Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.47
While this author would prefer that the Court return to the
42 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Due respect for
the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a
congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds."); Mank, supra note 3, at 792-93 (arguing Lopez and Morrison
did not claim to overrule prior decisions applying rational basis review to statutes
challenged as exceeding congressional commerce power and Morrison explicitly stated
that there is presumption that statute is constitutional under Commerce Clause); see
also infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 416-26 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 416-26 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 438-40 and accompanying text.
46 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 210 (stating "either the means or the ends
should be able to provide the requisite connection to interstate commerce"); Schapiro &
Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1245-47 (arguing the Endangered Species Act seeks to address
a variety of interests, including targets of regulation and beneficiaries); see also infra
notes 91, 332, 429 and accompanying text.
47 See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1201-05, 1219-23, 1258-60(arguing Lopez and Morrison require court's to identify the central object of a
regulatory statute in determining whether it regulates commercial activities within
scope of Commerce Clause and criticizing this "unidemensional" approach).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
deferential approach used from 1937 until 1995, this Article
attempts to discern whether Viejo or GDF better comply with
the Court's current but highly flawed Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Proceeding along that framework, the Article
concludes that the primary object or goal of the ESA is to
protect endangered species rather than to regulate commercial
activities.48 Accordingly, this Article proposes that courts follow
GDF's approach for two reasons. First, because it is more
consistent with Lopez and Morrison's rationale that the
Commerce Clause preserves state and local control over most
non-commercial, intrastate activities, unless national
regulation of those intrastate activities is an essential
component of a broader regulatory program for interstate
commerce. Second, it provides superior support for achieving
Congress's clear goal in the 1973 Act of protecting all
endangered species."
Section II summarizes the early efforts of Congress to
protect endangered species and discusses the enactment of the
comprehensive 1973 ESA. Section III examines the Supreme
Court's deferential interpretation of the Commerce Clause from
1937 until 1995 and its recent emphasis in Lopez, Morrison,
and SWANCC that the commerce power is generally limited to
commercial activities and does not usurp traditional state
authority over non-commercial, intrastate activities. Section IV
discusses the first two court of appeals decisions to assess the
constitutionality of the ESA after Lopez or Morrison: the
District of Columbia Circuit's decision concerning an obscure
fly in National Association of Home Builders v. Babbitt (NAHB)
and the Fourth Circuit's decision regarding the red wolf in
Gibbs v. Babbitt. Section V critically examines the District of
Columbia Circuit's commercial activities rationale in Viejo.
Section VI positively assesses the Fifth Circuit's aggregation of
all endangered species approach in GDF. Section VII concludes
that GDF's aggregation methodology is more consistent with
the Court's decisions in Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC, but
also criticizes the Court's recent Commerce Clause
jurisprudence for creating substantial uncertainties about
which activities fall within the commerce power.
48 See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1246 (acknowledging "the stated
purpose of endangered species law is the protection of endangered species," although
arguing Act seeks to address a variety of other interests); infra notes 350, 381-84, 430-
72 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 84, 89-96, 430 and accompanying text.
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II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
A. The 1966 and 1969 Acts: Protecting Endangered Species
on Federal Lands Is Not Enough
There is a long history of federal regulation of
endangered species, although the 1973 ESA represents a
culmination of federal regulation.' In 1900, Congress enacted
the Lacey Act, which prohibits interstate commerce in animals,
birds, or the byproducts of animals or birds killed in violation
of state law, and requires the Secretary of Agriculture to
protect game animals and birds.51 By enacting the Lacey Act,
Congress took a cautious first step toward acknowledging that
protecting endangered species was a national problem
requiring federal regulation."' Nevertheless, during the early
twentieth century, federal authority over wildlife was more
limited than today.' At the time, the Supreme Court still
recognized state ownership of all wildlife, a doctrine the Court
fully rejected only in 1979.' Lower court decisions of that era
See Mank, supra note 3, at 773-75. See generally Holly Doremus,
Comment, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diversity, 18
ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 287-305 (1991) (discussing growth of national regulation of
American wildlife and plant law); Davina Kari Kaile, Note, Evolution of Wildlife
Legislation in the United States: An Analysis of the Legal Efforts to Protect Endangered
Species and the Prospects for the Future, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 448-54
(1993) (same).
51 Lacey Act, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §
701, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378, and 18 U.S.C. 42 (2000)) (forbidding the interstate
transport of animals killed in violation of state law); Philip Weinberg, Does That Line
in the Sand Include Wetlands? Congressional Power and Environmental Protection,
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), Sept. 2000, at 10894, 10897; Shannon Petersen,
Comment, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative History of the
Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 463, 469 (1999). The Lacey Act now applies to all
wild animals, including those bred in captivity, and to plants protected by treaty or
state law. 16 U.S.C. § 3373 (2000) (establishing penalties for violating provision);
White, supra note 3, at 221 (discussing enactment in 1900 of Lacey Act); see also
George Cameron Coggins & Anne Fleishel Harris, The Greening of American Law?: The
Recent Evolution of Federal Law for Preserving Floral Diversity, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J.
247, 305-07 (1987) (discussing 1981 Lacey Act Amendments).
52 See Mank, supra note 3, at 773-74 (discussing Lacey Act as first step in
process of creating national regime for protecting endangered species); Kaile, supra
note 50, at 446-48 (same); Petersen, supra note 51, at 469 (same).
See Doremus, supra note 50, at 287-92.
See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (upholding Connecticut
statute prohibiting interstate transportation of game birds that had been killed within
state), overruled, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329 (1979) ("The erosion of Geer
began only 15 years after it was decided."); Mank, supra note 3, at 774; Doremus, supra
note 50, at 287-88; White, supra note 3, at 248-49.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
concluded that the federal government did not have authority
under the Commerce Clause to regulate migratory birds.'
In 1916, avoiding uncertainties about the scope of
federal authority over interstate commerce by instead relying
on the Constitution's Treaty Clause,' the federal government
took another step toward national regulation of wildlife when it
signed a treaty with Canada to protect migratory birds. 7 To
implement the treaty, Congress enacted the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act of 1918, which forbade the taking of many bird
species and explicitly preempted inconsistent state laws.' In
the 1920 case Missouri v. Holland,59 the Supreme Court upheld
the Act as a necessary and proper exercise of Congress's treaty
power.' The Court concluded that the conservation of
endangered wildlife was a "national interest of very nearly the
first magnitude."6  In 1940, after the Supreme Court had
adopted a broader interpretation of the Commerce Clause,
2
Congress used its authority under the commerce power to enact
the Bald Eagle Protection Act, which forbids taking,
possessing, selling, or exporting bald eagles or any of their
parts.'
In the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966,'
recognizing that many states had failed to preserve these
species, Congress sought a more comprehensive approach to
'5 See United States v. McCallagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915) (holding
Department of Interior did not have authority under Commerce Clause to regulate
migratory birds); United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914), appeal
dismissed, 248 U.S. 594 (1919); Doremus, supra note 50, at 292-93.
56 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (treaty power); id. art. VI, cl. 2 (treaties
binding on states); White, supra note 3, at 224-34 (discussing using treaty power to
protect endangered species).
17 Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-Gr.
Brit., T.S. No. 628. Great Britain signed the Treaty on behalf of Canada as overseer of
Canadian foreign affairs. See also Petersen, supra note 51, at 469.
16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (2000); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 500 (4th Cir.
2000) (explaining significance of Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918); Petersen, supra
note 51, at 469.
59 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
60 Id. at 435; Mank, supra note 3, at 774.
61 See Missouri, 252 U.S. at 435.
62 Beginning in 1937, the Supreme Court adopted a far more deferential
rational basis approach to reviewing congressional legislation enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937); supra note
3 and accompanying text.
0 See Bald Eagle Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 76-567, 54 Stat. 250 (1940)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (2000)); Petersen, supra note 51, at 470.
See Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966).
[Vol. 69:3
20041 REGULATING INTRASTATE ENDANGERED SPECIES 935
protecting the growing number of endangered species."
Congress explicitly authorized the Department of Interior to
continue its practice of creating a list of endangered species."
Furthermore, using its spending power authority7 to control
the actions of federal agencies, Congress encouraged the
Departments of Agriculture and Defense to cooperate
voluntarily with the Department of Interior to conserve species
"insofar as is practicable" in light of their statutory missions.'
The 1966 Act focused on preserving endangered species
on federal lands and on acquiring additional federal land if
necessary to accomplish preservation goals. 9  Using its
authority under the Property Clause to regulate federally
owned lands,"M Congress created a National Wildlife Refuge
System to prohibit the taking of listed endangered species
living within the System.71 Because the federal government
owns one-third of all land in the United States, and almost half
of all land in the eleven westernmost states, the Property
Clause gives Congress significant authority to protect many
endangered species."2 Nevertheless, the 1966 Act did not protect
Edward A. Fitzgerald, Seeing Red: Gibbs v. Babbitt, 13 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
29-30 (2002) (discussing 1966 Act); Kaile, supra note 50, at 448-51 (same); Petersen,
supra note 51, at 471 (same).
See § 1(c), 80 Stat. at 926 (repealed 1973); Petersen, supra note 51, at 471.
67 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; White, supra note 3, at 223 (observing that
certain provisions in Endangered Species Act are valid pursuant to Spending Clause).
Congress can also use its financial resources to encourage voluntary compliance withits policies by states or others. See generally Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a
Positive Source of Environmental Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147 (2001)(discussing how Spending Clause can validate environmental legislation); SouthDakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (permitting Congress to condition funds on State's
adoption of a minimum drinking age).
68 See § 1(b), 80 Stat. at 926; Doremus, supra note 50, at 296; Kaile, supra
note 50, at 451-53; Petersen, supra note 51, at 471; White, supra note 3, at 221. The1969 Act required federal agencies to conserve species to the "extent practicable." See
Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 3(a), 83 Stat. 275 (1969); Kaile, supra note 50, at 449-53.
See Doremus, supra note 50, at 295-96; Kaile, supra note 50, at 449.
70 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; Sophie Akins, Note, Congress' PropertyClause Power to Prohibit Taking Endangered Species, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 167,183-86 (2000) (discussing congressional authority under property clause to protect
environment and endangered species).
71 See § 4, 80 Stat. at 926-29 (1966) (repealed 1973); Fitzgerald, supra note65, at 29-30 (discussing 1966 Act); Doremus, supra note 50, at 296; Petersen, supra
note 51, at 472 (same); White, supra note 3, at 221 (same). The Property Clause grantsCongress the "power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States," including
purchasing land or regulating existing land to pursue federal policies, but does not
provide authority to regulate non-federal lands. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2;
Akins, supra note 70, at 183-86.
72 Akins, supra note 70, at 183.
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the majority of endangered or threatened species in the United
States because most are located on non-federal land that
cannot be regulated under the Property Clause.73
Like the 1966 statute, the Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1969 focused on preserving endangered
species on federal lands and acquiring new federal lands for
preservation." Additionally, Congress in the 1969 Act
recognized the international causes of the extinction problem
by requiring the Secretary of the Interior to develop a list of
species "threatened with worldwide extinction" and prohibiting
the importation of these animals or any of their byproducts
without a permit." Congress used its authority under
Commerce Clause to prohibit such imports." Furthermore, the
1969 Act enlarged federal authority to acquire habitat for
endangered species.7 Moreover, the 1969 Act expanded the
definition of "fish or wild life" to include amphibians, reptiles,
and invertebrates. 8 Finally, the 1969 Act encouraged the
executive branch to negotiate an international convention to
protect endangered species from extinction, which later led to
the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), which primarily
applies to the import and export of endangered species. 9
B. The 1973 Amendments
In response to evidence that the 1966 and 1969 Acts did
not reduce the growing numbers of species extinction because
71 See Jeanine A. Scalero, Case Note, The Endangered Species Act's
Application to Isolated Species: A Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce?, 3 CHAP.
L. REV. 317, 321 (2000) (stating "almost 80% of all protected species have some or all of
their habitat on privately owned land"). According to the General Accounting Office, in
1993 there were 781 species listed under the ESA - over 90 percent of these species
have some or all of their habitat on nonfederal lands. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483,
502 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, sub nom. Gibbs v. Norton, 531 U.S. 1145 ( 2001).
Nearly three-fourths of the listed species had over 60 percent of their habitat on
nonfederal lands. Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502.
74 See Kaile, supra note 50, at 451-52.
" See Pub. L. No. 91-135, §§ 2-3(a), 83 Stat. 275 (1969); Fitzgerald, supra
note 65, at 30; Kaile, supra note 50, at 451-53; Petersen, supra note 51, at 472.
76 See Fitzgerald, supra note 65, at 30; Petersen, supra note 51, at 472.
77 See Doremus, supra note 50, at 297; Fitzgerald, supra note 65, at 30;
Petersen, supra note 51, at 472.
78 § 2, 83 Stat. 275; Doremus, supra note 50, at 296; Petersen, supra note 51,
at 472.
79 § 5, 83 Stat. 275; Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087; Petersen, supra note
51, at 472-73 (discussing the Convention); White, supra note 3, at 222, 226 (same).
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these statutes were restricted to federal lands,' ° Congress with
the support of President Richard Nixon" enacted a new ESA in
1973, which repealed the 1966 and 1969 Acts."2 The 1973 Act
covered both more species and more territory than the 1966
and 1969 statutes. The 1973 Act prohibited takings of not only
"endangered" species but also "threatened" species, defined as
those that may become endangered in the near future." Most
significantly, the 1973 Act went beyond regulation of federal
lands to protect endangered and threatened animals on all land
in the United States, including state, local governmental or
private land, and the territorial seas of the United States."
In enacting the broader 1973 ESA, Congress primarily
relied on its power under the Commerce Clause, although it
also continued to use its authority under the Property Clause
to regulate federal lands and the Spending Clause to regulate
federal agencies and provide incentives for cooperation by
states.' The text and the legislative history of the 1973 Act
extensively discussed the potential impact of endangered
species themselves on interstate commerce while also
indicating that commercial development was a primary cause
of their extinction." As an example, the ESA states that many
of the species threatened with extinction are of "esthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific
80 See Fitzgerald, supra note 65, at 31; Kaile, supra note 50, at 446; Petersen,
supra note 51, at 473.81 In 1972, President Nixon proposed the enactment of a stricter statute to
protect endangered species, stating that "even the most recent act to protect
endangered species, which dates only from 1969, simply does not provide the kind of
management tools needed to act early enough to save a vanishing species." 118 CONG.
REC. 3140, 3143 (1972) (special message to Congress from President Richard Nixon
outlining the 1972 Environmental Program); Doremus, supra note 50, at 297(discussing Nixon Administration's support for stronger Endangered Species Act);Petersen, supra note 51, at 473, 476, 480 (same). On December 28, 1973, President
Nixon signed the ESA into law. Petersen, supra note 51, at 476.
82 See Kaile, supra note 50, at 454.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1538(a)(1) (2000); Fitzgerald, supra note 65, at 31(discussing 1973 Act); Kaile, supra note 50, at 454 (same and noting 1973 Act expanded
beyond 1966 and 1969 Acts to include threatened species).
84 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2000); Fitzgerald, supra note 65, at 31(discussing 1973 Act); Kaile, supra note 50, at 456.
95 Congress could have attempted to rely on its treaty power to justify
regulation of non-federal land, but the scope of its authority is less certain. See White,
supra note 3, at 224-34 (arguing treaty power provides less stable support for
Endangered Species Act than the Commerce Clause because treaties may be amended
by either United States or another nation). Whether the Endangered Species Act can
be justified under the treaty power is beyond the scope of this Article.
See Nagle, supra note 8, at 193; infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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value to the Nation and its people."' Additionally, supporting
Viejo's commercial activities theory, the ESA found that
"various species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United
States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of
economic growth and development untempered by adequate
concern and conservation."' However the 1973 ESA's
legislative history shows that Congress placed the greatest
emphasis in justifying the protection of endangered species
under the Commerce Clause on the potential future economic
and medical benefits of preserving a wide variety of species and
a robust genetic heritage." The House Report explained:
As we homogenize the habitats in which these plants and animals
evolved, and as we increase the pressure for products that they are
in a position to supply (usually unwillingly) we threaten their - and
our own - genetic heritage.
The value of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable ....
Who knows, or can say, what potential cures for cancer or other
scourges, present or future, may lie locked up in the structures of
plants which may yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed? More to
the point, who is prepared to risk being [sic] those potential cures by
eliminating those plants for all time? Sheer self interest impels us to
be cautious.'
87 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (2000).
88 Id. § 1531(a)(1); Nagle, supra note 8, at 193. See also H.R. 37, 93d Cong.,
2(a) (1973) (proposing legislative finding that "one of the unfortunate consequences of
growth and development in the United States and elsewhere has been the
extermination of some species or subspecies of fish and wildlife").
89 See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1050-52 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (discussing emphasis on future economic and medical benefits in 1973 ESA's
legislative history and concluding that congressional concern for future economic
benefits was appropriate basis for national regulation under Commerce Clause); Gibbs
v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 496-97 (4th Cir. 2000) (same); Mank, supra note 3, at 729-30,
756-57, 782-92 (arguing congressional concern for future economic benefits in 1973
ESA's legislative history was appropriate basis for national regulation under
Commerce Clause); see also Nagle, supra note 8, at 193 & n.76 (discussing
congressional concern for future economic and medical benefits in 1973 ESA's
legislative history).
90 H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973). Similarly, the Senate Report on the
1969 ESA, noted:
From a pragmatic point of view, the protection of an endangered species of
wildlife with some commercial value may permit the regeneration of that
species to a level where controlled exploitation of that species can be
resumed. In such a case businessmen may profit from the trading and
marketing of that species for an indefinite number of years, where otherwise
it would have been completely eliminated from commercial channels in a very
brief span of time. Potentially more important, however, is the fact that with
each species we eliminate, we reduce the [genetic] pool . . .available for use
by man in future years. Since each living species and subspecies has
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Although the statute and legislative history provide some
support for the Viejo court's focus on the effect of commercial
activities on endangered species, the above quotation from the
House Report shows that the actual and potential commercial
value of the endangered species themselves appears to have
been of the greatest interest to Congress."
The ESA currently asserts protection over every
endangered or threatened species of fish and wildlife in the
United States.' In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,3 a 1978
case involving the endangered "snail darter" fish and a massive
federal dam project that threatened to cause its extinction, the
Supreme Court characterized the Act as "the most
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered
species ever enacted by any nation.' The Hill Court observed,
"The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to
halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever
the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies of the
Act, but in literally every section of the statute.""5 As an
example, the Court cited Section 2 of the ESA, which states
that one of its main purposes is "to provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened
species depend may be conserved ... "'
Other sections of the Act illuminate the depth of the
federal government's commitment to protecting endangered
species. Section 4 mandates that the Secretary of Interior
developed in a unique way to adapt itself to the difficulty of living in the
world's environment, as a species is lost, its distinctive gene material, which
may subsequently prove invaluable to mankind in improving domestic
animals or increasing resistance to disease or environmental contaminant, is
also irretrievably lost.
S. REP. No. 91-526, at 3 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1415.
91 See Mank, supra note 3, at 729-30, 756-57, 782-92 (arguing Congress in1973 ESA's legislative history emphasized concern for future economic and medicalbenefits); see generally Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052-54 (discussing
emphasis on future economic and medical benefits in 1973 ESA's legislative history
and concluding that congressional concern for future economic benefits was appropriate
basis for national regulation under Commerce Clause); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 496-98
(same).
See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995). However, endangered or threatened plants are only protected
on federal lands. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (2000); see generally Coggins & Harris,
supra note 51, at 278-303 (discussing Endangered Species Act's limited protection of
plants).
!3 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
' Id. at 180.
95 Id. at 184.
96 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000); Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 698.
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ascertain which species are "in danger of extinction throughout
all or a significant portion of [their] range . . '. . After the
Secretary makes a judgment under Section 4 regarding the
danger of extinction, Section 5 requires the Secretary to create
a list of all "endangered" and "threatened" species and to
identify the scope of the critical habitat necessary for the
survival of these species."8 The Secretary must decide whether a
species is endangered or threatened "solely on the basis of the
best scientific and commercial data available to him after
conducting a review of the status of the species . . . ."" The
Secretary must first conclude that a species is endangered or
threatened before he can issue a regulation protecting it."
Next, the Secretary must establish recovery plans for listed
species that will achieve their "conservation and survival."
'
' As
soon as a species has recovered and its survival is no longer
threatened, the federal government may no longer protect it;
non-threatened animals are under exclusive state authority
unless they enter federal lands. 2
Congress still uses its authority under the Property and
Spending Clauses to protect endangered species on federal land
or from actions by federal agencies, respectively. In Section 5 of
the current ESA,'3 Congress has used its authority under the
Property Clause to authorize the Secretary of Interior to
acquire land to assist in the preservation of endangered and
threatened species." Section 6 qualifies that authority by
providing that the Secretary should acquire land in cooperation
with the States."5
Pursuant to Congress's authority under the Spending
Clause to control federal agencies and their budgets, Section 7
directs federal agencies to "insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
97 The Secretary of Commerce also plays a role. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6)
(2000); Mank, supra note 3, at 730.
98 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2000); Mank, supra note 3, at 730.
99 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000); Mank, supra note 3, at 730-31.
"0 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2000); Mank, supra note 3, at 731.
101 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2000); Mank, supra note 3, at 731.
102 See Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483, 503 (4th Cir. 2000); Mank, supra note 3,
at 731, 781.
103 See 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (2000).
"9 See id. § 1535(a).
See id. § 1535(a).
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modification of [critical] habitat. .. ."' According to Section 7,
all federal agencies must consult with the Secretary before
undertaking projects that could harm endangered or
threatened species or their critical habitat.' °7 After consulting
with the Secretary, federal agencies in theory can refuse to
follow the Secretary's views on whether a project will harm
endangered or threatened species, but the Secretary's authority
to seek civil or criminal penalties generally ensures that
federal agencies will comply with the FWS's interpretation of
the ESA."'
C. Section 9 and Private Land
Section 9 of the ESA raises the most concerns about the
scope of congressional authority because it relies on the
Commerce Clause to regulate all non-federal lands, including
private property.' 9 During the 1973 congressional debates
preceding the enactment of the ESA, some members of
Congress raised concerns that Section 9 would necessarily
preempt all state laws regulating wildlife, but congressional
supporters of the ESA successfully argued that the proposed
statute promoted concurrent federal-state regulation of
endangered species rather than purely national control."'
Section 9(a)(1) of the ESA prohibits "any person," including
private individuals, from taking any endangered or threatened
species without a permit or other authorization from the
Secretary."' Section 9 defines the term "take" to include any
private activities "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct."" Under the statute, any person who knowingly
destroys the critical habitat of an endangered species is subject
1"c Id. § 1536(a)(2).
107 See id. § 1536(a)(3); Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-
73 (1978).
108 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b) (2000); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(6), 3571(b), (e) (2000).
109 See Mank, supra note 3, at 731-32.
See Petersen, supra note 51, at 474.
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2000). Section 9 only prohibits the taking of
endangered wildlife and does not protect endangered plants on private property. See
id.; Petersen, supra note 51, at 465 n.23, 480 n.162. The statute protects only
endangered or threatened plants that are on federal lands or on non-federal land where
a state statute specifically provides protection to a plant. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B)(2000); Mank, supra note 3, at 728 n.27. See generally Coggins & Harris, supra note 51,
at 278-303 (discussing ESA's limited protection of plants).
112 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2000).
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to criminal penalties - a fine of up to fifty thousand dollars, one
year in prison, or both."'
An important issue is the definition of "taking" an
endangered species, especially by the destruction of critical
habitat on private land. In defining Section 9(a)(1)'s ban
against taking endangered species, the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) of the Department of Interior has issued
regulations prohibiting "significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife .... ."",
Accordingly, private landowners may not substantially modify
or harm the critical habitat of endangered species if such
changes will result in the death or injury of those species.
Congress, however, has provided some exceptions to this
prohibition. A property owner may apply for a permit
authorizing habitat modification that will cause incidental
harm to endangered species if the owner provides an
appropriate habitat conservation plan showing that the
proposed modifications comport with the long-term
preservation of the species."' Accordingly, although the taking
provision imposes potentially significant restrictions on states,
local governments, private persons, and their property, the
ESA is limited because the statute only seeks to assert
regulatory authority where it is necessary to preserve
threatened or endangered species and otherwise leaves
regulatory authority within state or local control."'
In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon (Sweet Home),"' the Supreme Court in 1995
upheld the FWS regulations prohibiting private land owners
from engaging in activities causing "significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife.""8 In his majority decision, Justice Stevens concluded
that the regulations comported with the "ordinary
understanding" and the dictionary definition of the verb form of
"harm" in Section 9(a)(1)'s text because that verb "naturally
"' Id. § 1540(b); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(a)(6), 3571(b), (e) (2000).
114 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
"5 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2000) ("if such taking is incidental to, and
not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity").
116 See Mank, supra note 3, at 777-80 (arguing federal regulation of
endangered species is consistent with Hodel's rationale that federal government may
regulate intrastate activities if there is a serious failure by state regulators to do so);
infra notes 432, 457, 472 and accompanying text.
117 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
118 Id. at 696-708 (addressing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3).
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encompasses habitat modification that results in actual injury
or death to members of an endangered or threatened species.""9
Additionally, the Court determined that the regulations
were consistent with Congress's broad statutory goal of
preventing species extinction. ° Furthermore, the Court
concluded that Congress's 1982 amendments to the statute,
which added Section 10's "incidental take" permit provision,'
showed that Congress interpreted the Act to include indirect as
well as direct harm because these permits would most likely
apply to indirect critical habitat modification by private
individuals.12 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, argued that
the words to "take" and to "harm" as used in the Act could not
possibly mean "habitat modification," but should be understood
to prohibit only direct attempts to kill wildlife.'23
Significantly, the Court decided Sweet Home two
months after its Lopez decision, suggesting that the Court
believed that neither Section 9 nor the FWS regulations
exceeded the limits of the Commerce Clause, although that
issue was not before the Court.' It is notable that Justice
Kennedy joined Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Sweet
Home.'' As discussed below, Justice Kennedy wrote a
concurring opinion in Lopez,12 joined by Justice O'Connor, that
adopted an arguably less restrictive approach to reviewing
congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause than
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion."7 Additionally, in
Sweet Home, Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion that
agreed with the majority as long as the FWS regulation was
19 Id. at 697-98.
120 Id. at 698-99.
121 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2000).
122 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700-01.
123 See id. at 714-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist
Approach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency
Decisionmaking Is Better than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231,
1265-66 (1996).
124 See Mank, supra note 3, at 734-35 (arguing that Supreme Court's decisionin Sweet Home shortly after it decided Lopez at least suggests that the Court did not
perceive a significant commerce clause problem with section 9 of the ESA and FWS's
regulations protecting critical habitat on private land).
125 Id. at 734.
126 See infra notes 170-74, 209-12 and accompanying text.
127 See Mank, supra note 3, at 734, 740-41 (arguing Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Lopez suggests he applies more deferential approach to reviewing
congressional legislation than Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia or Justice
Thomas).
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limited to "significant habitat modification that causes actual,
as opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to
identifiable protected animals."'28 While it did not address the
issue of whether Congress has authority under the Commerce
Clause to pass the ESA, the Court's Sweet Home decision
provides some indirect support for the statute's
constitutionality because it is likely that the Court would have
at least hinted about the issue if a majority perceived a serious
constitutional problem.
Moreover, the Sweet Home Court showed deference that
the SWANCC Court eschewed. In Sweet Home, the Court
determined that pursuant to the Chevron doctrine it was
appropriate to defer to the Secretary's interpretation of the
statute. The doctrine states that courts should defer to an
agency's interpretation if a statute is ambiguous and the
interpretation is reasonable."n The Sweet Home decision
declared that "[wihen it enacted the ESA, Congress delegated
broad administrative and interpretive power to the Secretary,"
and deference was especially appropriate here where "[tihe
proper interpretation of a term such as 'harm' involves a
complex policy choice."3° By contrast, the SWANCC Court
declined to defer under the Chevron doctrine to the
government's interpretation of the Clean Water Act over
"isolated," intrastate wetlands because the majority stated that
there were serious questions whether Congress has the power
under the Commerce Clause to regulate such wetlands."'
128 See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708-14 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9 Id. at 703-08; Mank, supra note 123, at 1265.
130 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 708.
131 Initially, the SWANCC Court stated that the Chevron doctrine did not
apply because the Court concluded that Section 404 of the Act, which governs wetlands
was not ambiguous, but "clear." SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001). The Court added,
however, that "even were we to agree with respondents" that the statute was
ambiguous, "we would not extend Chevron deference here." Id. The Court invoked the
principle of statutory interpretation that it would avoid interpretations that raised
serious constitutional questions unless there was a clear statement in the statute
demonstrating Congress desired such a broad interpretation. Id. at 172-73; Maya R.
Moiseyev, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers: The Clean Water Act Bypasses a Commerce Clause Challenge, But Can the
Endangered Species Act?, 7 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 191, 195 (2001).
The Court did not find any clear statement in the Act demonstrating that Congress
intended to include isolated, intrastate wetlands within the statutory definition of
navigable waters defining the statute's jurisdiction, especially because "[plermitting
respondents to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the
'Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the States'
traditional and primary power over land and water use." SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
Accordingly, the Court rejected the Corps' "request for administrative deference" to the
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Arguably, if it had similar constitutional concerns under the
Commerce Clause, the Sweet Home Court would not have so
easily deferred to the FWS's interpretation of the "take"
provision, although that issue was not before the Sweet Home
Court. The Court in Sweet Home, however, was addressing a
case involving the fairly significant spotted owl endangered
species and not the truly isolated intrastate species that are
the subject of this Article. It thus remains to be seen how the
Court, especially Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, would
address the issues in cases similar to GDF and Viejo.
III. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
The Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States . ,,"32 While the breadth of congressional
authority to regulate interstate commerce raises many
questions, ' a particularly difficult issue is determining when
intrastate activities sufficiently impact interstate commerce to
trigger Commerce Clause authority. Frequently, a crucial issue
in Commerce Clause analysis is the question of whether
Congress may aggregate various intrastate activities in
determining their impact on interstate commerce." In this
context, the question becomes whether courts should evaluate
the impacts of individual endangered species or the aggregate
impacts of all endangered species.
interpretation of the Act in the migratory bird rule. Id. Instead, the Court read the
statute "as written to avoid the significant constitutional and federalism questions
raised by respondents' interpretation, and therefore reject the request for
administrative deference. Id.
132 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
in For instance, there is a long standing debate about whether the original
intent of the Commerce Clause was limited to only interstate trade and transportation
of goods or allows broader regulation. Compare Randy E. Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001) (arguing original intent
of Commerce Clause was to regulate only interstate trade and transportation of goods),
with Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, Essay, A Critique of the Narrow
Interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 707-15 (2002) (arguing
original understanding of text of Commerce Clause allows broad regulation of activities
connected to interstate commerce).
,34 Compare Mank, supra note 3, at 782-95 (arguing courts should defer under
rational basis test to Congress's decision in ESA to aggregate together impacts of all
endangered species because there is limited number of such species and concurrent
federal authority exists to regulate endangered species), with Nagle, supra note 8, at
180, 192-204 (discussing aggregation problem relating to Endangered Species Act and
arguing it is inappropriate in light of Lopez to aggregate often dissimilar endangered
species).
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A. The Development of the Commerce Clause: To Aggregate
or Not to Aggregate Interstate Activities?
From 1937 until 1995, the Court invariably upheld
congressional regulation of intrastate activities on the ground
that they had broader impacts on interstate commerce.'" Most
notably, in the 1942 case Wickard v. Filburni" the Court for
the first time aggregated small, intrastate activities to
determine their total impact on interstate commerce. There,
the Court held that Congress could prohibit farmers from
growing wheat exclusively for home consumption because
homegrown wheat competed with commercially sold wheat in
interstate commerce. The Court reached this conclusion despite
the fact that the wheat was grown and consumed entirely
within state borders, and in relatively small individual
quantities.'37 While acknowledging that one farmer's intrastate
activities did not have a "substantial" impact on interstate
commerce, the Wickard Court concluded that the Commerce
Clause encompasses apparently inconsequential actions that
substantially affect interstate commerce when aggregated
"together with that of many others similarly situated."" In
Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist described Wickard as "perhaps
the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority
over intrastate activity."'39
A significant problem with the Wickard aggregation
rationale is that it is unclear which intrastate activities courts
should aggregate in determining whether the effect upon
interstate commerce justifies legislation under the Commerce
Clause.4 6 Subsequently, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
'3' See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604-09 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(discussing numerous Court decisions from 1937 until 1995 approving congressional
legislation under Commerce Clause); see, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276-82 (1981) (upholding Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 regulating intrastate mining activities under Commerce
Clause); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 246, 252-53 (1964)
(upholding civil rights legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in public
accommodations under Commerce Clause); Dral & Phillips, supra note 3, at 10413;
Mank, supra note 3, at 737, 742, 746; Brignac, supra note 3, at 874.
36 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
137 See id. at 125-30.
"' See id. at 127-28.
139 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (discussing Wickard).
140 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 179-80 (stating "[wihat Wickard does not
answer is the level of generality that Congress is permitted to use when aggregating
'similar' activities.").
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United States, TM the Court broadly applied the aggregation
principle in upholding civil rights legislation prohibiting racial
discrimination in public accommodations, such as hotels,
despite objections that the accommodations themselves did not
move across state lines. The Court reasoned that in the
aggregate these establishments clearly affected interstate
travel.142 However, the much more recent Lopez and Morrison
decisions have limited aggregation to economic activities,
except perhaps in unusual circumstances.'43
In a case even more clearly regulating purely intrastate
activities, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass'n," the Court approved federal regulation of intrastate
mining activities under the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977. Although the regulation aimed to
prevent purely intrastate environmental harms, the Court held
it valid on the ground that the absence of federal legislation
would likely lead to ruinous competition among states in
lowering state environmental standards in order to retain or
attract businesses from other states.' 5 In other words, Congress
under the Commerce Clause could enact legislation to prevent
states from engaging in a "race-to-the-bottom" to attract
businesses because such competition would probably result in
inappropriate intrastate environmental standards."' In
approving federal regulation of intrastate mining operations,
the Court stated, "The prevention of this sort of destructive
interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional
action under the Commerce Clause." 7 In the related case of
Hodel v. Indiana,"' the Supreme Court stated that "[a] complex
regulatory program . . . can survive a Commerce Clause
challenge without a showing that every single facet of the
program is independently and directly related to a valid
congressional goal. It is enough that the challenged provisions
are an integral part of the regulatory program and that the
regulatory scheme when considered as a whole satisfies this
141 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
142 Id. at 246.
143 See infra notes 160-63, 189-95, 207 and accompanying text.
144 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
145 See id. at 281-82 (observing congressional concern that such competition
among states would prevent "adequate standards on coal mining operations within
their borders") (internal quotation marks omitted).
146 See id.
147 Id. at 282.
148 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
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test.'. 9 Under Hodel's rationale, one could reasonably justify
regulation of purely intrastate endangered species on the
ground that states might fail to protect them because of
economic competition."
B. A Lopez Revolution: The Supreme Court Narrows the
Commerce Power
For the first time since 1936, the Supreme Court in the
1995 case United States v. Lopez..' determined that a federal
statute exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause."' The Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
(GFSZA) of 1990," which made possession of a gun within a
school zone a federal criminal offense, exceeded congressional
commerce power because the activity was primarily non-
economic, it had little direct relationship to interstate
commerce, and because regulation of intrastate crime was
largely a state or local function." It remains to be seen the
extent to which Lopez constitutes a rejection of the Court's
lenient review from 1937 until 1995 of federal statutes relying
on the Commerce Clause.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion contended
that Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause was
limited to regulating three types of activities: (1) "the use of the
channels of interstate commerce"; (2) "the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce . . ."; and (3) "those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce . . . i.e., those activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce.""5 Although Lopez's
three-part test is on its face consistent with prior cases, many
commentators have argued that the Lopez Court applied these
tests more strictly than the Court had since 1936.1' The Lopez
149 Id. at 329 n.17; see Adrian Vermeule, Dialogue, Centralization and the
Commerce Clause, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), Nov. 2001, at 11334, 11335.
'50 Mank, supra note 3, at 778.
151 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
'5' William Funk, The Court, the Clean Water Act, and the Constitution:
SWANCC and Beyond, Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), July 2001, at 10741, 10763.
153 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-67.
Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
' See id. at 608-09 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing Lopez majority did not
use rational basis standard in reviewing statute as it claimed, but a more stringent
standard that was not clearly explained); Dral & Phillips, supra note 3, at 10417-18
(arguing Lopez and Morrison claimed to use rational basis standard for reviewing
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Court determined that the GFSZA was not justified under the
first two tests primarily because the statute lacked any nexus
or jurisdictional requirement limiting its scope to guns that
had moved through interstate commerce."' The Court, however,
did not mandate that a statute must have an express
jurisdictional requirement to survive review, perhaps because
such a nexus might be implied for some types of commercial
activities even without an explicit legislative finding orlimitation."
The Lopez Court arguably applied the third test, the
substantial effect standard, more narrowly than had any Court
since 1936. Stressing that the Commerce Clause is usually
about economic regulation, the Lopez decision suggested that
Congress has authority under the commerce power to enact
legislation regulating "economic activity" that has substantial
impacts on interstate commerce, but generally does not have
power to regulate non-commercial activities that may indirectly
affect interstate commerce. 9 Rejecting the view that a statute
may aggregate a wide range of commercial and non-commercial
activities as long as some of them have a substantial impact on
interstate commerce, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the
aggregation principle used in Wickard should be limited to
genuinely economic activities because the Wickard Court had
stated that Congress may regulate activity that "exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce."" The
legislation under Commerce Clause, but actually used more stringent and uncertain
standard); Mank, supra note 3, at 744-45 (same); Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 3, at
1219-23 (arguing Lopez's emphasis on primarily economic basis of Commerce Clause is
contrary to prior cases and makes it unlikely Court will approve legislation regulating
non-commercial activities); Brignac, supra note 3, at 881-82 (arguing Morrison court
claimed to use rational basis review, but Morrison decision stringently reviewed
whether activity substantially affects interstate commerce); Jason Everett Goldberg,
Note, Substantial Activity and Non-Economic Commerce: Toward a New Theory of the
Commerce Clause, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 563, 571, 594-603 (2001) (arguing that Morrison
purported to use rational basis review, but actually applied far more stringent yet
uncertain standard).
15 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
15 See GDF, 326 F.3d 622, 640 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, No. 01-51099,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3933 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2004) (en banc) (concluding ESA is
limited to interstate activities even though statute lacks express jurisdictional
element); Mank, supra note 3, at 762 (observing Lopez encouraged but did not requirejurisdictional statement); White, supra note 3, at 243, 253-54 (suggesting Congress
might evade Commerce Clause problems by adding jurisdictional limit).
159 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-63; Funk, supra note 152, at 10763.
1 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (emphasis added); see also
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (emphasizing Wickard was case involving economic activity and
arguing its aggregation principle applies only to economic activities); Schapiro &
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Court stated "[w]here economic activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be
sustained."'61 The Court emphasized that the congressional
commerce power authorizes regulation of only activities that
have a "substantial relation to interstate commerce" and
"substantially affect interstate commerce... 2 The Court did
suggest that Congress may enact legislation regulating some
intrastate activities that lack a substantial impact on
interstate commerce if the regulatory scheme is "an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated.""'
The Court concluded that gun possession did not fall
within the third test for activities that "substantially affect[]"
interstate commerce because it was neither a commercial
activity in itself nor an essential ingredient for a primarily
interstate economic activity." Furthermore, the Court
concluded that the statute's legislative history had made only
general conclusions about the impact of violent crime on
interstate commerce, failing to make specific findings about the
effect on interstate commerce of gun possession in school
zones."' Accordingly, the Court held that the statute exceeded
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause because
there was no evidence supporting Congress's assertion that gun
possession in school zones had a substantial impact on
interstate commerce."' Although demanding more specific
evidence that an activity has substantial economic impacts on
interstate commerce, the Lopez Court failed to explain whether
or how its approach differed from rational basis review, leading
to considerable confusion for lower courts.
A clue for understanding Lopez lies in its underlying
federalist or states' rights philosophy that national regulation
Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1222 (arguing Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez read Wickard
too narrowly as authorizing aggregation of economic activities).
' Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
162 Id. at 559.
1 See id. at 561; Vermeule, supra note 149, at 11335.
1 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (holding that the GFSZA is not "an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity"); Dral & Philips, supra note 3, at
10414.
"5 See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 28, at 341 (discussing Lopez's
observation that GFSZA lacked congressional findings supporting legislative
conclusion that guns near schools affected interstate commerce).
6 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
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of non-economic activities that have traditionally been
regulated by state or local governments would weaken our
federal system. '67 The Court implied that it would more strictly
review federal statutes under the Commerce Clause when
federal regulation intruded on subject matters traditionally
controlled by state or local governments. The Lopez Court
rejected Congress's "costs of crime" and "national productivity"
justifications for the GFSZA because under these rationales it
is "difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in
areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where
States historically have been sovereign."" The Court also
observed that regulation of school areas was within the
"general police power" retained by the states and therefore not
appropriate under the Commerce Clause absent a valid
economic relationship with interstate commerce."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by
Justice O'Connor, also adopted a federalist approach to
interpreting the Commerce Clause, but his methodology was
arguably more flexible than that employed in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion.17 Justice Kennedy maintained
that the Court should delineate the outer reaches of the
commerce power in view of a policy of balancing federal and
state authority, especially in non-commercial areas
traditionally regulated by states.17 ' Because education is
traditionally a state rather than federal subject, Justice
Kennedy contended that courts should be reluctant to sanction
federal legislation that targets an "area of traditional state
concern" to which "States lay claim by right of history and
expertise."7  Under an overly broad interpretation of the
commerce power that sanctioned federal regulation of
167 See id. at 561 n.3; Mank, supra note 3, at 770-72; infra notes 171-74, 196-
98, 208-12 and accompanying text.
16 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
161 See id. at 567.
170 See Ann Althouse, Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38
ARIz. L. REV. 793, 801-04 (1996) (discussing Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" concurrence
in Lopez as more moderate than Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion; Mank,
supra note 3, at 740-41, 746, 771; Stephen R. McAllister, Essay, Is There a Judicially
Enforceable Limit to Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause, 44 U. KAN. L.
REV. 217, 238-42 (1996) (praising Justice Kennedy's "pragmatic" approach to
federalism as model for future cases)
171 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-77 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 3, at
740-41 White, supra note 3, at 238-39.
172 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580, 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 3,
at 740-41.
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traditional areas of state concern, he warned that "the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority
would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.'...
Justice Kennedy stated that Congress could regulate non-
commercial activities having a nexus to interstate commerce if
the legislation did not intrude on areas within the traditional
state police power."'
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, argued that the
majority opinion was inconsistent with prior decisions by the
Court upholding statutes regulating activities that had much
less impact on interstate commerce than the possession of a
gun on school grounds.7 ' He maintained that Congress had a
rational basis for finding a substantial relation between the
possession of a gun in a school zone and interstate commerce."'
Moreover, he contended that the majority's distinction between
"commercial" and "noncommercial" transactions was
inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, which he maintained
authorizes regulation of either type of activity as long as it
significantly impacts interstate commerce. '77 Additionally, he
maintained that the majority's distinction between
"commercial" and "noncommercial" activities was unworkable
because it was impossible to make such delineations.
173 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 3, at
740-41.
174 See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring); David A.
Linehan, Endangered Regulation: Why the Commerce Clause May No Longer Be
Suitable Habitat for Endangered Species and Wetlands Regulation, 2 TEx. REV. L. &
POL. 365, at 404-05 (1998); Mank, supra note 3, at 740-41; Scalero, supra note 73, at
329; White, supra note 3, at 238-39. Arguably, even Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion implied that Congress might use the commerce power to regulate non-economic
activities that do not intrude on traditional areas of state control. See Louis J. Virelli
III & David S. Leibowitz, "Federalism Whether They Want It or Not": The New
Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Federal Civil Rights Legislation After
United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 954 (2001); see also Mank, supra
note 3, at 741 n.106.
175 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding federal loan sharking criminal statute within
Commerce Clause), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 within Commerce Clause), Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969)
(holding the regulation of an intrastate amusement park within Commerce Clause),
and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding the regulation of consumption of
homegrown wheat within Commerce Clause)); Dral & Phillips, supra note 3, at 10414-
15.
176 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
... Id. at 627-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Dral & Phillips, supra note 3, at
10418-21.
178 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 627 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, he criticized the majority for fomenting "legal
uncertainty in an area of law that, until this case, seemed
reasonably well settled.''
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Souter
attacked the majority opinion for quietly undermining the
rational basis test that the Court had used since 1937 to review
legislation under the Commerce Clause."' After providing a
thorough historical review of the Court's Commerce Clause
decisions before 1937, he contended that the Court had
regressed to its problematic pre-1937 approach by requiring
more than a rational basis for non-commercial activities even
though it was impossible in many cases to distinguish between
commercial and non-commercial activities."' Also, he argued
that the Court had created additional confusion by implying
that whether it used rational basis review would depend on
whether a statute addressed a subject of traditional state
regulation.'8" Moreover, he criticized the Court for suggesting
that it would apply rational basis review only for statutes in
which Congress had included explicit factual findings justifying
its legislative conclusion that an activity substantially affects
interstate commerce."
C. Morrison Follows Lopez
In 2000, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Morrison" held that the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
which provided a civil damages remedy for victims of gender-
based violence," exceeded congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause because the activity was essentially non-
economic and was only indirectly connected to interstate
commerce."' Following Lopez's third test, the Morrison Court
179 Id. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
180 Id. at 603-08 (Souter, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing Lopez's commercial versus
non-commercial distinction as unworkable); Seinfeld, supra note 22, at 1276-87
(discussing difficulties lower courts have encountered in distinguishing economic from
non-economic activities).
182 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608-09 (Souter, J., dissenting).
183 Id.
18 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
18 42 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994).
1 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613-19. The Court also held that Congress lacked
authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact § 13981, but that issue is
beyond the scope of this Article. Id. at 619-27; Bryant & Simeone, supra note 28, at
328.
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emphasized that "in those cases where we have sustained
federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the
activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the
activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor. " '7
The Court rejected congressional findings that gender-based
violence had significant effects on interstate commerce because
the causal connection between gender-based crimes and any
economic consequences was too indirect and attenuated."
Furthermore, the Morrison Court "reject[ed] the
argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect
on interstate commerce."89 Because the aggregation of non-
economic activities could justify federal usurpation of
traditional state functions, the Court expressed strong
reservations about allowing Congress to aggregate non-
economic activities to show a substantial effect on interstate
commerce." "If accepted, petitioners' reasoning would allow
Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide,
aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on
employment, production, transit, or consumption.. 9
Additionally, judicial acquiescence to congressional legislation
based on the aggregation of non-economic activities under the
Commerce Clause could "completely obliterate the
Constitution's distinction between national and local
authority."92 For instance, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion maintained that the aggregation of non-economic
activities could "be applied equally as well to family law and
other areas of traditional state regulation since the aggregate
effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national
economy is undoubtedly significant. 9 3 The Morrison Court
reiterated that past decisions had aggregated only economic
activities in determining whether an activity had substantial
impacts on interstate commerce." The Morrison Court,
however, did not adopt a firm rule that aggregating non-
economic activities is always inappropriate, stating: "While we
187 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611.
's Id. at 615-16.
199 Id. at 617.
0 Id. at 615-17.
'91 Id. at 615.
192 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
193 Id. at 615-16.
19 Id. at 610-11.
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need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases,
thus far . . our cases have upheld Commerce Clause
regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature."95
Moreover, the Morrison decision, like Lopez, asserted
federalist concerns in determining that the VAWA improperly
interfered with traditional state control over family law and
criminal issues.'" The Court stated, "[Wie can think of no better
example of the police power, which the Founders denied the
National Government and reposed in the States, than the
suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims."19 As
had the Lopez Court, the Morrison Court cautioned that courts
should examine the constitutionality of legislation under the
Commerce Clause in light of this principle. "The Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what
is truly local." "
By contrast, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter
again relied on Wickard and its progeny in contending that
Congress "has the power to legislate with regard to activity
that, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce."' He argued that the Court should have applied a
rational basis standard and concluded that Congress did have a
rational basis for determining that gender-motivated violence
significantly impacts interstate commerce."
D. The Impact of Lopez and Morrison on the Congressional
Commerce Power
It is not clear whether the Lopez and Morrison decisions
created a new standard for reviewing legislation under the
Commerce Clause, but both cases applied a far more restrictive
approach than the Court had between 1937 and 1995.1 Neither
195 Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
19 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 617-18.
'9 Id. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting).
200 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting).
201 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604-09 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the Lopez majority for claiming to use but failing to follow
deferential rational basis review used by the Court since 1937); Dral & Phillips, supra
note 3, at 10417-18 (arguing Lopez and Morrison claimed to apply rational basis
standard in reviewing legislation under Commerce Clause, but actually used more
stringent yet uncertain standard); Mank, supra note 3, at 744-45 (same); Goldberg,
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case explicitly rejected past decisions using a rational basis
test, but it is not clear whether the standard of review that
they used is the same as rational basis review. In Morrison, the
Court employed a standard of legislative review similar to but
not exactly the same as rational basis review, declaring: "Due
respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government
demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only
upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its
constitutional bounds. " " Yet both decisions employed a far less
deferential approach than prior Commerce Clause decisions
despite using an arguably similar standard.2 3 Notwithstanding
its purportedly deferential test for reviewing congressional
legislation, the Morrison Court refused to bow to congressional
conclusions about the substantial impact of gender-based
violence on interstate commerce not because the Court doubted
that there was such an impact, but rather because any indirect
impact, no matter how substantial, was deemed irrelevant
when it flowed from non-commercial, intrastate activities." In
his Morrison dissent, Justice Souter argued that the majority
in both Lopez and Morrison had purported to use a substantial
effects test, but in fact had applied a different and uncertain
standard. 5 By applying the rational basis test in a different
supra note 156, at 571, 594-603 (arguing that Morrison claimed to apply rational basis
review, but actually used more stringent standard that was never clearly explained);
supra notes 156, 180-83 and infra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
202 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. See also Mank, supra note 3, at 744-45;
Goldberg, supra note 156, at 607.
203 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604-09 (Souter, J., dissenting);
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628, 637 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Morrison
majority for purportedly using deferential rational basis review, but actually applying
more stringent standard); Dral & Phillips, supra note 3, at 10417-18; Mank, supra note
3, at 744-45 (same); Brignac, supra note 3, at 881-82 (arguing Morrison court claimed
to use rational basis review, but Morrison decision stringently reviewed whether
activity substantially affects interstate commerce); Goldberg, supra note 156, at 571,
594-603 (2001) (arguing that Morrison purported to use rational basis review, but
actually applied far more stringent yet uncertain standard).
204 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (stating deferential presumption of
constitutionality standard); id. at 614-15 (declining to defer to congressional finding
that gender-based violence substantially affects interstate commerce); Bryant &
Simeone, supra note 28, at 343-44 (arguing Morrison acknowledged truth of
congressional findings that gender-based violence affected interstate commerce, but
deemed such impacts irrelevant because such violence is non-commercial, intrastate
activity outside boundaries of Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 3, at 744-45
(criticizing Morrison for failing to defer to legislative findings of impact of gender-based
violence on interstate commerce and suggesting Court applied less deferential
standard than previous cases).
205 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 637-38 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at
603-11 (Souter, J., dissenting); Dral & Phillips, supra note 3, at 10417 & n.99; Mank,
supra note 3, at 742, 744-45.
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way than prior Commerce Clause decisions without fully
articulating why and without explaining the precise contours of
the test or the manner of its application, Justice Souter
maintained that the Lopez and Morrison decisions failed to
provide clear direction for lower courts.' 6
The Lopez and Morrison decisions did provide at least
two significant additions to Commerce Clause jurisprudence
that suggest when the Court will apply heightened rational
basis review. First, both Lopez and Morrison emphasized that
the Commerce Clause primarily concerns economic regulation
and suggested that non-economic legislation will receive less
deferential review from the Court."7 Second, both decisions
emphasized federalist principles as a basis for determining the
appropriate level of scrutiny and implied that federal
legislation intruding on traditional state areas of regulation
will receive much less deference."' The two principles are
interrelated because states have traditionally regulated many
non-economic activities through criminal and family law. The
Lopez and Morrison decisions suggest that the Court will
strictly review legislation that regulates non-economic
activities traditionally regulated by states.
Consistent with the above ideas, Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Lopez may provide the best explanation
for how the Court is likely to decide close Commerce Clause
cases in the future. " Although agreeing with the rational basis
test used by the Court between 1937 and 1995, Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez interpreted the
Commerce Clause in light of federalist principles that prohibit
Congress from enacting legislation that has only incidental
commercial concerns and interferes with traditional state
functions."° In cases not involving traditional state regulation,
206 See Dral & Phillips, supra note 3, at 10417-18 (criticizing Lopez and
Morrison for using uncertain standard of review); Mank, supra note 3, at 744-46
(same); Goldberg, supra note 156, at 606-08 (arguing uncertain standard of review in
Lopez and Morrison has confused lower courts).
207 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-17 (emphasizing that Commerce Clause
primarily regulates economic activities); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-62 (same); Funk, supra
note 152, at 10763 (discussing emphasis in Lopez and Morrison on economic basis of
Commerce Clause); Mank, supra note 3, at 737-38, 743 (same).
208 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-67; Mank, supra
note 3, at 770-71; supra notes 171-74, 196-98 and accompanying text; infra notes 209-
12 and accompanying text.
209 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Mank, supra note
3, at 740-41, 746, 771.
210 See generally Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
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Justice Kennedy has suggested that he will apply the
deferential rational basis review in determining whether
activities have "substantial effects" on interstate commerce. He
has explicitly rejected Justice Thomas's argument that the
Court adopt a narrow, laissez-faire pre-1937 interpretation of
the commerce power."' Until there are substantial changes in
the membership of the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy's
approach to federalism and the Commerce Clause is likely to
predict future decisions."'
E. SWANCC and the "Precise Object" of Commerce Clause
Regulation
Another crucial aspect of the Court's Commerce Clause
analysis is determining exactly what a statute seeks to
regulate. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),"' the
Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision held that a regulation
defining the Corps' jurisdiction to include "isolated" intrastate
wetlands and waters serving as habitat for migratory birds
exceeded its statutory authority under the Clean Water Act."4
Notably, the same five justices constituted the majority in
Lopez, Morrison, and SWANCC: Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Moreover,
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented in
each case."5 The SWANCC Court concluded that the Act's
reliance on the term "navigable waters" in defining the scope of
the statute's wetlands jurisdiction demonstrated that Congress
211 See generally id. at 574-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Althouse, supra note
170, at 802 (arguing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez recognized need for
modern understanding of the commerce power in light of today's economic system);
McAllister, supra note 170, at 229 (same); Byron Dailey, Note, The Five Faces of
Federalism: A State-Power Quintet Without a Theory, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1248-49
(2001) (arguing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lopez clearly rejected Justice
Thomas' proposed return to 18th century understanding of commerce).
22 See generally Dailey, supra note 211, at 1286-88 (discussing how five
justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Justice O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas, vote in federalism cases and arguing that Justice Thomas' views about
commerce power are "extreme").
213 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
214 Id. at 174 (invalidating Final Rule for Regulatory Programs for the Corps
of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986)); Funk, supra note 152 (discussing
SWANCC); Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands After
SWANCC, Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), June 2001, at 10669 (same); Mank, supra
note 3, at 725 (same); Moiseyev, supra note 131, at 194-95 (2001) (same).
215 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 655; SWAANC, 531 U.S.
at 176.
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did not intend to reach "isolated" intrastate wetlands or waters
that are not connected or adjacent to navigable waters.2 " The
Court narrowly interpreted the Act's jurisdiction to include
only "navigable waters" or non-navigable waters that are
adjacent to or have a "significant nexus" with navigable
waters.217 By basing its holding exclusively on statutory
interpretation, the Court avoided determining whether federal
regulation of isolated, intrastate waters or wetlands was
beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause.21
In dicta, however, the Court implied that the Corps'
purported regulation of isolated, intrastate waters lay outside
the purview of the commerce power because states and local
governments had traditionally exercised exclusive jurisdiction
over those waters.219 Accordingly, the Court determined that to
include "federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling
within the 'Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a significant
impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over
land and water use."22  While dicta, the SWANCC decision's
discussion of the Commerce Clause demonstrates similar
federalism concerns as those expressed in Lopez and
Morrison.21
216 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 163-64, 167-68 (interpreting Federal Water
Pollution Control Act §404(a), 33 U.S.C. §1344(a) (commonly known as the Clean
Water Act)). See generally Funk, supra note 152, at 10746-59 (criticizing SWANCC for
construing term "navigable waters" too narrowly); Michael P. Healy, Textualism's
Limits on the Administrative State: Of Isolated Waters, Barking Dogs, and Chevron,
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.), Aug. 2001, at 10928 (same); Johnson, supra note 214, at
10672 (same); Mank, supra note 3, at 725-26 (same).
"' See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-73 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla.
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)); Mank, supra
note 3, at 726.
218 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172-73 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla.
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)); Johnson, supra
note 240, at 10673 (discussing SWANCC's deliberate avoidance of constitutional issue,
but possible impact of its dicta); Mank, supra note 3, at 726 (same); Moiseyev, supra
note 131, at 195 ("Although the Court did not reach the Commerce Clause challenge to
the Migratory Bird Rule, it did suggest that the Corps' interpretation breached the
outer limits of congressional authority.").
219 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (citing Hess v. Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) ("[Rlegulation of land use [is] a function
traditionally performed by local governments")); Mank, supra note 3, at 726, 748
(discussing SWANCC decision's dicta regarding role of state and local governments in
land use regulation); Moiseyev, supra note 131, at 195 (same).
"0 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174; Mank, supra note 3, at 726, 748; Moiseyev,
supra note 131, at 195.
"' See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336(1971) ("[Ulnless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have
significantly changed the federal-state balance"); Dral & Phillips, supra note 3, at
10421 (discussing SWANCC decision's dicta regarding role of state and local
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Additionally, in dicta, the SWANCC decision questioned
whether the fact that migratory birds frequently cross state
lines makes all of their habitat entitled to protection under the
Commerce Clause, and suggested that the government had
failed to demonstrate the extent to which isolated, intrastate
wetlands were crucial habitat necessary to preserve the birds'
commercial value.222 The Corps contended that the migratory
bird regulation was justified under the Commerce Clause's
authority to regulate activities that "substantially affect"
interstate commerce because the birds generated over one
billion dollars a year from recreational activities such as
hunting and tourism." In the 1920 decision Missouri v.
Holland,"4 which upheld a treaty protecting migratory birds,
the Supreme Court recognized the economic importance of
migratory birds, stating that their preservation was a "national
interest of very nearly the first magnitude."225 However, in
dissenting from the Court's denial of certiorari in Cargill, Inc.
v. United States,2' Justice Thomas stated that the assumption
that "the self-propelled flight of birds across state lines creates
a sufficient interstate nexus to justify the Corps' assertion of
jurisdiction over any standing water that could serve as a
habitat for migratory birds . . . likely stretches Congress'
Commerce Clause powers beyond the breaking point."227 In
SWANCC, the Court did not directly address whether the
presence of migratory birds was sufficient to justify regulation
of intrastate, isolated wetlands under the Commerce Clause,
but it stated that this argument "raise[d] significant
constitutional questions. For example, we would have to
evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce.""
Although its reference to "precise object or activity" is
not absolutely clear, the SWANCC decision suggested that
neither the value of the migratory birds nor the commercial
activities that motivated the filling in of the wetlands could
justify congressional regulation because they were not the
governments in land use regulation); Johnson, supra note 214, at 10673 (same); Mank,
supra note 3, at 726, 748-49 (same); Moiseyev, supra note 131, at 195 (same).
222 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
223 Id.
24 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
221 Id. at 435.
226 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
227 Id. at 958.
228 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
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precise object of the statute.2" Instead, the Court implied that
the wetlands themselves are the "object" that must
substantially affect interstate commerce.23 In the lower courts,
the Corps had based its authority to regulate the petitioner's
land on the presence of "water areas used as habitat by
migratory birds."23' Perhaps anticipating the majority's concern
with whether isolated, intrastate wetlands were essential to
the commercial value of the birds, the Corps before the Court
added a new argument that the threatened wetlands had a
relationship to interstate commerce because the petitioner's
construction project, a municipal landfill, had significant
economic impacts on interstate commerce." The Court
suggested that it was unhappy with the Corps' last minute
shift in its arguments, stating, "For although the Corps has
claimed jurisdiction over petitioner's land because it contains
water areas used as habitat by migratory birds, respondents
now, post litem motam, focus upon the fact that the regulated
activity is petitioner's municipal landfill, which is 'plainly of a
commercial nature. '"' More importantly, the Court expressed
doubts about the Corps' new argument because "this is a far
cry, indeed, from the 'navigable waters' and 'waters of the
United States' to which the statute by its terms extends."" The
Court suggested that it would not exclusively focus on the
commercial activities causing the destruction of natural
resources and instead would look to whether there was some
close relationship between the natural object and the
commercial activities.
However, the SWANCC decision failed to provide a clear
direction to lower courts about how they should decide what is
the central "object" of a statute - specifically about whether the
229 See Moiseyev, supra note 131, at 195.
230 See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1243 n.252 (arguing Lopez and
Morrison focused on the commercial activities that were the "target" of the challenged
statute, but that "[tihe SWANCC decision, on the other hand, seemed to focus more on
the beneficiaries of regulation-wetlands and migratory birds."); see also Michael J.
Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetland Regulations, 90 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2163 (2002)(suggesting SWANCC focused on the purpose of the statute and regulations); Christine
A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 38 (2003)(suggesting SWANCC focused on the environmental benefits of the statute and
regulations); Moiseyev, supra note 131, at 195.
231 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
232 Id.
233 Id. (citing Brief for Federal Respondents, at 43).
234 Id.; Virginia S. Albrecht & Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Could SWANCC Be
Right?: A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
11042, 11053 (September 2002).
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object is the statute's regulatory "targets" or its beneficiaries -
and how close the nexus must be between the object and the
commercial purposes of the Commerce Clause.235  Some
commentators have argued that "the object regulated [in
SWANCCI is the intrastate water."2 3 Others contend that in
the Clean Water Act, "Congress is not regulating wetlands use;
it is regulating the economic, and often commercial activity of
land use and development." 7 While not clearly defining the
"precise object" at issue in the case, the stronger argument is
that the SWANCC court was focusing on the purpose of the
statute and regulations - benefiting wetlands - rather than on
the commercial activity being regulated, the landfill.' As
discussed below, the SWANCC Court's focus on the
environmental purposes of the statute and regulations rather
than the landfill supports the argument in GDF and weakens
that in Viejo, although the evidence is admittedly not perfect.'
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that Congress
could validly regulate isolated, intrastate wetlands inhabited
by migratory birds for two reasons: because filling the wetlands
usually has significant impacts on interstate commerce and
because the birds themselves substantially affect interstate
commerce through hunting and tourism. First, unlike the
majority, he accepted the government's late argument that
construction activities destroying isolated wetlands frequently
have significant interstate commercial impacts, observing that
"the discharge of fill material into the Nation's waters is almost
always undertaken for economic reasons."4 Additionally, he
contended that eliminating isolated, intrastate wetlands
significantly impacts interstate commerce by reducing the
235 Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1227-28, 1248-49 (arguing SWANCC
failed to clarify whether the targets or beneficiaries of regulatory statute are its
"object" and which types of commercial activities are within scope of Commerce
Clause).
2 Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of
Congress's Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 849, 890 (2002).
237 Marianne Moody Jenkins & Nim Razook, United States v. Morrison: Where
the Commerce Clause Meets Civil Rights and Reasonable Minds Part Ways: A Point and
Counterpoint from a Constitutional and Social Perspective, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 23, 54
(2000).
238 See Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1243 n.252; see also Gerhardt,
supra note 230, at 2163; Klein, supra note 230, at 38 (2003).
239 See infra notes 381-84 and accompanying text.
240 SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 193 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Moiseyev,
supra note 131, at 196.
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migratory bird population and thereby decreasing hunting and
tourism24 ' He argued that congressional legislation regulating
isolated wetlands was constitutional because "the causal
connection between the filling of wetlands and the decline of
commercial activities associated with migratory birds is not
'attenuated,'2 '2 [but instead] is direct and concrete."241 Moreover,
he maintained that the migratory bird rule did not intrude on a
traditional area of local government responsibility because the
national government had long assumed the role of protecting
migratory birds as a national asset. 44 With the above analysis
in mind, this Article will now examine two important court of
appeals decisions addressing the commerce power in the more
specific context of endangered species.
IV. PREVIOUS ENDANGERED SPECIES DECISIONS: NAHB AND
GIBBS
Before the recent GDF and Viejo decisions, two
important cases had addressed the constitutionality of the
Endangered Species Act under the Commerce Clause in light of
Lopez. First, in 1997, in National Association of Home Builders
v. Babbitt (NAHB),"4' by a two-to-one vote, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the constitutionality
of the ESA in a case involving the endangered Delhi Sands
Flower-Loving Fly, a purely intrastate species that had no
significant commercial value. 4' The significance of NAHB was
arguably weakened by the fact that the two judges in the
majority largely disagreed about the grounds for finding the
ESA constitutional as applied to the fly. Additionally, NA-IB
was decided before Morrison or SWANCC, and it is important
to assess its precedential value in light of those two cases.
In 2000, twenty-two days after the Supreme Court had
decided Morrison, in Gibbs v. Babbitt,47 the Fourth Circuit in a
241 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 194-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Moiseyev, supra
note 131, at 196.
141 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612); Moiseyev, supra note 131, at 196.
24 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 195 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Gibbs v. Babbitt,
214 F.3d 483, 492-93 (4th Cir. 2000)); Moiseyev, supra note 131, at 196.
2 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 195-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
246 See generally infra notes 248-87 and accompanying text.
247 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Gibbs v. Norton, 531
U.S. 1145 (2001); see Dave Owen, Gibbs v. Babbitt, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 377 (2001).
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two-to-one decision by Chief Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson IV
rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the ESA in a case
addressing a FWS regulation prohibiting the taking of
endangered red wolves on private land. The Gibbs decision is
arguably distinguishable from NAHB, Viejo, and GDF because
red wolves create interstate commercial value through tourism,
pelts and, negatively, by harming farm animals that are objects
of interstate trade. Because both GDF and Viejo extensively
discuss these two cases, it is essential to examine NAHB and
Gibbs.
A. NAHB's Competing Rationales: Preserving Biodiversity,
Saving Ecosystems, and Regulating Private Development
Commentators have viewed NAHB as an important case
because the fly is such an insignificant species, possessing no
real commercial value and existing only in one state.24 In
NAHB, previous commercial development and pollution had
limited the fly's habitat to a forty square-mile area entirely
within the state of California.29 There is no significant
commercial market in either the fly or interstate
transportation of the fly."o To build a proposed hospital,
developers needed to build new roads that would likely have
destroyed the fly's habitat and possibly its entire population."5 '
The FWS concluded that the proposed road would result in the
"taking" of the endangered fly in violation of Section 9(a)(1) of
the ESA. In response, the developers mounted a Commerce
Clause challenge on the grounds that the fly resided in only
one state and did not substantially affect interstate
commerce.252
Judges Wald and Henderson together constituted the
majority in NAHB, but they made generally different
arguments for sustaining the validity of the FWS's action. In
dissent, Judge Sentelle contended that the fly was simply not
an article in interstate commerce and therefore not within the
commerce power.2" He also disagreed with Judge Wald's
"channels of commerce" and "biodiversity" arguments as well
248 See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 8 (focusing on NAHB fly case).
241 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1043-44.
250 Id. at 1043-44; Brignac, supra note 3, at 884.
25, NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1044-45.
252 Id. at 1045.
23 Id. at 1062-67 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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as Judge Henderson's ecosystem impacts and commercial
development arguments."
1. Judge Wald's Opinion
Judge Wald emphasized that it is appropriate to
consider the aggregate value of all endangered and threatened
species in determining their impact on interstate commerce,
refusing to accept the developers' argument that the
appropriate focus was the commercial value of the fly alone. 5
By aggregating the total value of all endangered and
threatened species, Judge Wald argued that the regulation of
the fly was constitutional under Lopez's first category,
concerning the use of channels of commerce, and third
category, regarding activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce. 2" First, she determined that the FWS's prohibition
against "taking" the fly under Section 9(a)(1) of the ESA
satisfied Lopez's first prong because regulations forbidding the
taking of endangered species are crucial to accomplish the
federal regulation of interstate transportation of these
species. Similar to laws disallowing the transfer and
possession of machine guns, she argued, regulations forbidding
the taking of endangered species are essential to laws
restricting interstate sales of endangered species."
Additionally, Judge Wald argued that the ban against
the taking of endangered species was within Congress's
authority to "keep the channels of interstate commerce free
from immoral and injurious uses" because forbidding the
taking of endangered species prevented their immoral trade in
interstate commerce. 9 She maintained that the Supreme Court
25 See infra notes 266, 273, 277-78, 282, 287 and accompanying text.
255 See NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1046.
256 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1046; Mank, supra note 3, at 755; Scalero, supra note
73, at 337.
257 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1046; Mank, supra note 3, at 755.
258 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1046; Mank, supra note 3, at 755; Scalero, supra note
73, at 337.
259 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1048-49 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. UnitedStates, 379 U.S. 241, 246 (1964) (upholding use of commerce power to enact civil rightslegislation prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations), and United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (approving congressional use of commerce power
to enact legislation mandating employers meet minimum wage and maximum hour
limitations)); Scalero, supra note 73, at 337-38.
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in United States v. Darby," by prohibiting the exploitation of
employees producing lumber for interstate commerce, and
Heart of Atlanta, Motel, Inc. v. United States,"' by forbidding
racial discrimination by a hotel serving an interstate travelers,
had allowed Congress to use its commerce power "to rid the
channels of interstate commerce of injurious uses to regulate
the conditions under which goods are produced for interstate
commerce."262 She determined that Congress in the ESA had
likewise used this authority to prevent the elimination of an
endangered species "by a hospital that is presumably being
constructed using materials and people from outside the state
and which will attract employees, patients, and students from
both inside and outside the state."" She concluded, "Congress
is therefore empowered by its authority to regulate the
channels of interstate commerce to prevent the taking of
endangered species in cases like this where the pressures of
interstate commerce place the existence of species in peril."'
Judge Henderson, however, disagreed with Judge
Wald's argument that the ESA regulates channels of commerce
because endangered species are usually not commercially
marketable goods and therefore are different from commercial
products such as machine guns or lumber.6 In his dissenting
opinion, Judge Sentelle argued that Section 9(a)(1)(B) of the
ESA as applied to the fly is unconstitutional under Lopez's first
prong, contending that the ESA as applied to the fly does not
affect the channels of interstate commerce because the fly does
not traverse interstate boundaries.'
Furthermore, Judge Wald determined that the ESA's
takings prohibition, even as applied to the fly, satisfies Lopez's
third prong, regarding activities that have substantial impacts
on interstate commerce. 67 She read Lopez as encompassing
both commercial and noncommercial activities that have
26 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (approving congressional use of commerce power to
enact legislation mandating employers meet minimum wage and maximum hour
limitations).
261 379 U.S. 241, 246 (1964) (approving congressional use of commerce power
to enact civil rights legislation outlawing racial discrimination in public
accommodations).
212 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1048-49.
26 Id. at 1048.
264 Id. at 1048.
265 Id. at 1057-58 (Henderson, J., concurring).
266 Id. at 1063 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
267 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1049.
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substantial impacts on interstate commerce, although it is
debatable whether the Lopez majority intended to include non-
economic impacts within its substantial impacts test."'
Deferring to congressional conclusions in the ESA's 1973
legislative history relating to the importance of preserving
biodiversity and the potential value of future medical benefits,
Judge Wald found that "takings [of endangered species] . . .
would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce by
depriving commercial actors of access to an important natural
resource - biodiversity.269
In response to the argument that the fly did not
significantly affect interstate commerce because it had little
economic value, Judge Wald contended that each endangered
species, including the fly, is valuable because every time a
species becomes extinct and the number of wild species is
reduced, the extinction "has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce by diminishing a natural resource that could
otherwise be used for present and future commercial
purposes."27 She conceded that the economic and medical value
of many plants and animals is uncertain, but she argued that
each endangered species is entitled to protection because "[a]
species whose worth is still unmeasured has what economists
call an 'option value' - the value of the possibility that a future
discovery will make useful a species that is currently thought
of as useless."7' In the aggregate, Judge Wald concluded, the
extinction of endangered species has significant impacts on
interstate commerce because of species' unknown future
benefits.272 Both Judges Henderson and Sentelle, however,
disagreed with Judge Wald's biodiversity argument on the
ground that the medical and economic benefits of preserving
biodiversity are too speculative to meet Lopez's substantial
effect on interstate commerce test. 73
268 Id.; but see Linehan, supra note 174, at 421-22 (arguing Judge Wald's
broad approach to evaluating noncommercial impacts such as biodiversity was more
consistent with Justices Breyer and Souter's dissenting opinions in Lopez than the
majority opinion).
269 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1052-54; Scalero, supra note 73, at 338.
270 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1053.
271 Id. (citing Bryan Nolan, Commodity, Amenity, and Morality: The Limits ofQuantification in Valuing Biodiversity, in BIODivERsiTy 200, 202 (Edward 0. Wilson
ed., 1988)).
272 Id. at 1053-54.
273 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring); id. at 1064-65(Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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Further, relying on Hodel, Judge Wald contended that
Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate destructive economic competition resulting from
economic incentives that prevent states from regulating
destructive intrastate behavior.7 4  She determined that
Congress may regulate intrastate endangered species if
economic competition among states was likely to prevent them
from providing adequate protection to such species."5 Since
Congress enacted the 1973 Amendments to the ESA because
regulation by states had failed to protect endangered species,
Judge Wald concluded that the analysis in the two Hodel
decisions was applicable to the ESA and supported the
statute's constitutionality.7 ' Judge Sentelle rejected her use of
the reasoning in the two Hodel decisions on the ground that
Congress may only prevent destructive competition where
states are regulating commercial activities and that those cases
were inapplicable because the fly had no commercial value.
7
He argued, "Although [Judge Wald] asserts 'striking parallels'
between [the Hodel and Darby] cases and the present one, I see
no parallel at all. In each of those cases, Congress regulated
arguably intrastate commercial activities, specifically mining
and lumber production for interstate commerce."27
2. Judge Henderson's Concurring Opinion
Concurring with the court's judgment, Judge Henderson
agreed with Judge Wald that Section 9(a)(1)'s prohibition on
taking endangered species comports with the Commerce
Clause, but the former reached her conclusion by a somewhat
different reasoning process than the latter. Judge Henderson
determined that "the loss of biodiversity itself has a substantial
effect on our ecosystem and likewise on interstate commerce.
She asserted, "Given the interconnectedness of species and
ecosystems, it is reasonable to conclude that the extinction of
one species affects others and their ecosystems and that the
protection of a purely intrastate species . . . will therefore
substantially affect land and objects that are involved in
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 1066.
271 NAHB,130 F.3d at 1066 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
279 Id. at 1058-59 (Henderson, J., concurring).
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interstate commerce."" Thus, she agreed that there was a
rational basis to support the congressional assumption in the
ESA's legislative history that the taking of endangered species
substantially affected interstate commerce."' However, in
dissent, Judge Sentelle argued that Judge Henderson failed to
cite any evidence regarding how the extinction of the fly would
substantially affect commerce by harming its ecosystem, other
species, or anything else in interstate commerce."'
Additionally, Judge Henderson determined that the
ESA's regulatory scheme significantly influences interstate
commerce because the ESA regulates the hospital and road
construction on the fly's critical habitat. By obligating an
evaluation of how the development of pristine land will impact
endangered species such as the fly, the ESA "relates to both the
proposed redesigned traffic intersection and the hospital it is
intended to serve, each of which has an obvious connection
with interstate commerce."' Accordingly, even if the fly itself
did not substantially affect interstate commerce, she
maintained that the hospital construction was an activity that
obviously affected interstate commerce. She contended that the
hospital and road construction was enough to bring the fly
within the scope of the Commerce Clause because there was a
relatively direct connection between the construction and the
destruction of the fly's critical habitat." Judge Wald agreed
that the case in part involved the ESA's regulation of the
hospital construction and that commercial activity was enough
280 Id. at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557-59);
but see Nagle, supra note 8, at 186-189, 199 (questioning ecosystem and biodiversity
arguments that loss of even commercially insignificant endangered species is likely tohave substantial adverse economic impacts and suggesting more proof of economic
harm is required to justify Endangered Species Act under Commerce Clause).
281 NAHB at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995); but see Nagle, supra note 8, at 186-189, 199.
282 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); Linehan, supra note
174, at 424.
283 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring).
28 Id. at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring); Nagle, supra note 8, at 189-91,208-15 (discussing choice of activity problem, whether the focus should be on the fly'simpact on interstate commerce or the hospital construction's impact on fly and arguing
hospital construction is the appropriate focus); Linehan, supra note 174, 422-24(arguing Commerce Clause does not encompass protection of noncommercial activities
such as protection of fly simply because there is some connection to commercial
enterprise).
280 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 189-91, 208-15 (discussing choice of activityproblem, whether the focus should be on the fly's impact on interstate commerce or thehospital construction's impact on fly and arguing hospital construction is the
appropriate focus).
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to make the statutory scheme valid under the Commerce
Clause. She stated:
Like Darby, the case at hand involves a regulation of the conditions
under which commercial activity takes place. The statute in Darby
regulated the wages and hours of workers in Georgia who were
engaged in producing lumber for interstate commerce. Similarly, the
statute in this case regulates the taking of endangered species in the
process of constructing a hospital, power plant, and intersection that
will likely serve an interstate population."
u
Judge Sentelle, however, argued that any relationship between
the hospital or road construction and the ancillary consequence
of eliminating the fly's habitat was too diluted to justify federal
intervention under the Commerce Clause's "substantial effects"
standard because there was no "stopping point" in defining the
commerce power if Congress could regulate any non-economic
activity that was indirectly affected by any article in interstate
commerce. 87
B. Gibbs: The Red Wolf and the Federal Role
In Gibbs, the Fourth Circuit in a two-to-one decision
rejected a Commerce Clause challenge brought by private
landowners and municipalities in eastern North Carolina
against a FWS regulation prohibiting the taking of endangered
red wolves on private and municipal lands. The district court
had found that there were a total of seventy-five red wolves in
eastern North Carolina, approximately half of which resided on
private property.' In his majority opinion, Chief Judge J.
Harvey Wilkinson IV concluded that the goal of the FWS
regulation was valid under the Commerce Clause because
private development killing approximately forty to seventy-five
red wolves would substantially affect interstate commerce in
several ways: the wolves promoted tourism, were the object of
scientific research, possessed potentially valuable pelts (once
their population recovered), and had negative impacts on
farming and ranching, a valid commerce connection even
28 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1056 (Wald, J.) (citation omitted); see also id. at 1046
n.3 (agreeing with Judge Henderson that ESA appropriately regulates commercial
development of critical habitat).
28' Id. at 1063, 1067 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
28m Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 488 (4th Cir. 2000).
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though the economic impact was negative rather than
positive.'
Answering the argument in Judge Luttig's dissenting
opinion that the taking of a handful of red wolves did not have
a substantial impact on commerce, the majority determined
that it was fair to consider the effects that the whole ESA
regulatory scheme had on interstate commerce because the
regulation was part of a comprehensive statute seeking to
preserve the entire species." Because regulations protecting
red wolves have clear economic impacts,"' the Fourth Circuit
decided it was appropriate, in contrast to the aggregation of
non-economic activities rejected in Lopez or Morrison, for
Congress to aggregate the total impact of taking wolves in
determining that such takings could substantially affect
interstate commerce.292 Notably, because red wolves arguably
have significant economic value, the Gibbs decision may onlyjustify protecting species having some economic value in
interstate commerce and may not support congressional
authority over the numerous other endangered species that
have no current economic worth."3
V. VIEJO: FOCUSING ON THE ESA's REGULATION OF
DEVELOPMENT AS COMMERCE
Having explicated the relevant case law above, this
Article now turns its attention to the two cases at issue, first
discussing the Viejo decision and then, in the next section,
addressing GDF. In Viejo," the District of Columbia Circuit
29 Id. at 492-93 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560-61 (1995),
and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-15 (2000)); Owen, supra note 247, at382-83; but see Vermeule, supra note 149, at 11336 (questioning whether killing a red
wolf is a commercial or economic activity).
2W Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497-98.
2"1 The Court observed:
While the regulation might also reflect a moral judgment concerning the
importance of rehabilitating endangered species, this does not undermine the
economic basis for the regulation. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964) ("Congress was not restricted by the fact that
the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing
was also deemed a moral and social wrong.").
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 493 n.2.
292 Id. at 493.
2" See Owen, supra note 247, at 391, 398 (arguing Gibbs may have limitedprecedential effect because the red wolf has more obvious connection to interstate
commerce than many other endangered species); Brignac, supra note 3, at 883 (same).323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
focused on the ESA's regulation of a significant commercial real
estate development rather than the commercially insignificant
arroyo toad in order to demonstrate that the activity
substantially affected interstate commerce and thus was valid
under the Commerce Clause.9 The court stated that the
"regulated activity is Rancho Viejo's planned commercial
development, not the arroyo toad that it threatens."" In
essence, it approved and expanded Judge Henderson's
concurring opinion in NAHB. " Before proceeding to the
analysis, a brief review of the facts is in order.
A. Rancho Viejo's Proposed Development and the Arroyo
Toad
The Plaintiff Rancho Viejo planned to build a 280-home
residential development on a 202-acre site in San Diego
County, California.""8 When the plaintiff sought a Section 404
Clean Water Act' permit from the Army Corps of Engineers to
fill wetlands on the site, the Corps "determined that the project
'may affect' the arroyo toad population in the area, and sought
a formal consultation with the FWS pursuant to ESA Section
7."" 0 The FWS issued a Biological Opinion that concluded that
"excavation of the 77-acre borrow area would result in the
taking of arroyo toads and was 'likely to jeopardize the
continued existence' of the species."36' The FWS proposed that
Rancho Viejo could still build the project by using fill dirt from
off-site sources, but because using off-site fill would be more
expensive the plaintiff filed suit against the Secretary of
Interior, "alleging that the listing of the arroyo toad as an
endangered species under the ESA, and the application of the
ESA to Rancho Viejo's construction plans, exceeded the federal
government's power under the Commerce Clause."'.' "Holding
that Rancho Viejo's case was indistinguishable from NAHB,
and finding nothing in subsequent Supreme Court opinions to
25 See infra notes 304-35 and accompanying text.
296 Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1072.
27 See supra notes 283-86 and accompanying text; infra notes 306, 342-43 and
accompanying text.
29 Id. at 1065.
299 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
00 Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1065.
301 id.
302 Id. at 1065-66.
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cast doubt on that decision," the district court granted the
government's motion for summary judgment.303
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
government and agreed with its conclusion that NAHB was
still valid.3" Notably, the Viejo court's emphasis on Judge
Henderson's regulation of commercial development rationale
rather than the channels of commerce, biodiversity, or
ecosystem arguments in NAHB implies sub silentio that the
Viejo court thought those arguments to be weak or wrong.
B. Reviewing Lopez
The Viejo court concluded that the FWS's regulation of
Rancho Viejo's proposed real estate development satisfied
Lopez's four-factor test for determining if regulations or
legislation sufficiently affects interstate commerce to fall
within the commerce power.3"5 As to the first Lopez factor -
simply whether the regulated activity is commercial in nature
- the Viejo court concluded:
The regulated activity at issue in NAHB - the construction of a
hospital, power plant, and supporting infrastructure - was plainly
an economic enterprise. As Judge Henderson observed, "the
Department's protection of the flies regulates and substantially
affects commercial development activity." NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058;
see id. at 1056 (Wald, J.) ("[Tihe case at hand involves a regulation of
the conditions under which commercial activity takes place."). The
same is true here, where the regulated activity is the construction of
a 202 acre commercial housing development."
Notably, the Viejo court quoted Judge Henderson, the author of
the NAHB concurrence, and cited Judge Wald only to the
extent that she agreed with her colleague.
The court then looked to the second Lopez factor -
whether a statute contains an express jurisdictional element."
Section 9 of the ESA does not contain an express jurisdictional
provision restricting its scope, for instance, to takes "in or
affecting commerce."' The Viejo court observed, however, that
303 Id. at 1066.
304 Id. at 1068, 1080; see generally id. at 1068-80.
305 Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1068 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561
(1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000)).
30 Id. at 1068.
307 Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62, and Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12).
308 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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neither Lopez nor Morrison had required a valid statute to
include an express jurisdictional element. 3" The Viejo court
noted that NAHB, Gibbs, and decisions in three other circuits
had upheld the constitutionality of the ESA despite the absence
of an express jurisdictional provision."' In the absence of an
express jurisdictional element, a court "must determine
independently whether the statute regulates activities that
arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction,
which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect[] interstate
commerce."3"
As to the third Lopez factor - "whether there are
'express congressional findings' or legislative history 'regarding
the effects upon interstate commerce' of the regulated
activity"32 - there were no such specific findings regarding
commercial housing construction.3  There were more general
"express findings and legislative history indicating that
Congress enacted the ESA out of concern that land
development and habitat modification were leading to species
extinction and had to be controlled by federal legislation. " '
However, the Viejo court observed that Lopez did not require
specific findings in the legislative history if it was clear that an
activity significantly affected interstate commerce,3 5  and
concluded that "the naked eye requires no assistance here" to
discern that a 202-acre housing development affected
interstate commerce.1
Rancho Viejo also lost under the fourth factor, which
addresses whether the connection between a regulated activity
and interstate commerce is "too attenuated."3 M Focusing on the
species instead of the construction, Rancho Viejo contended
that preserving the toad, a species of little or no commercial
value, had too attenuated an impact on interstate commerce to
3_ Id. at 1068 & n.3.
3 0 Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1068 & n.4 (citing Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 557
(6th Cir. 2002), Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 211 (5th Cir.
2000), United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 1999), and
United States v. Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 675 (5th Cir. 1997)).
311 Id. at 1068 (quoting Moghadam, 175 F.3d at 1276 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
112 Id. at 1069 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62).
313 Id.
314 Id. at 1069 n.5.
315 Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1069 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63
(1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000)).
316 Id. at 1069.
317 Id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67, and Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612).
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satisfy this factor.318 However, the court concluded otherwise for
two reasons: "Iblecause the rationale upon which we rely
focuses on the activity that the federal government seeks to
regulate in this case (the construction of Rancho Viejo's
housing development), and because we are required to accord
congressional legislation a 'presumption of constitutionality..'3l.
C. NAHB Survives Morrison and SWANCC
Because the facts in Viejo were so similar to NAHB,
Rancho Viejo primarily argued that NAHB was no longer "good
law" in light of Morrison and SWANCC.32 ° The Viejo court
concluded that neither Morrison nor SWANCC cast doubt on
NAHB. 3" Because Morrison closely followed Lopez's four-factor
framework, 2 the Viejo court determined that Morrison did not
undermine the court's NAHB decision, which had followed that
same framework."' While rejecting the plaintiffs assertion that
Morrison had changed Lopez's first prong by limiting the
Commerce Clause to only economic regulation,32 the Viejo court
maintained that the ESA prohibition against taking toads was
economic in nature "because the ESA regulates takings, not
toads."325 In other words, in the court's view, the ESA regulates
commercial development that causes the taking of endangered
species and not the species themselves. Seen that way, because
the ESA regulates an activity - commercial development of
land - that substantially affects interstate commerce, it is
consistent with Morrison's instruction that "the proper inquiry"
is whether the challenged regulation is "a regulation of activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce."3 .
The court asserted that "Rancho Viejo's reliance on
SWANCC is even further from the mark."327 The court correctly
318 Id.
319 Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1069 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607).
320 Id.
321 Id. at 1070-71.
322 Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1071; see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609
(2000) ("Lopez... provides the proper framework for conducting the required analysis.
•."); Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Rather than breaking new
Commerce Clause ground, Morrison. derived its four-factor framework directly fromLopez.").
323 Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1071.
324 Id. at 1071-72 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613).
325 Id. at 1072 (emphasis in original).
326 Id. (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609) (emphasis added in Viejo).
327 Id. at 1071.
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observed that the SWANCC decision was based on its statutory
interpretation of the term "navigable waters" in the Clean
Water Act, which was read to exclude the isolated, intrastate
waters and wetlands that the Corps sought to regulate.3" In
dicta, the SWANCC Court did observe that to consider the
constitutionality of regulating isolated, intrastate waters and
wetlands to protect migratory birds the Court "would have to
evaluate the precise object or activity that, in the aggregate,
substantially affects interstate commerce."" The Viejo court
claimed that "identifying the 'precise activity' at issue in
Rancho Viejo's case only strengthens the conclusion that the
take provision of the ESA can constitutionally be applied to
plaintiffs construction project" because of the obvious impacts
of that project on interstate commerce." As the Fifth Circuit in
GDF recognized, however, what the SWANCC Court meant by
"precise object or activity" raises questions about whether
review of the ESA under the Commerce Clause requires a focus
on the commercial projects that the statute indirectly regulates
or the endangered species that are the main focus of the
statute."'
D. Following Judge Henderson's Commercial Development
Approach
The Viejo court rejected the plaintiffs arguments that
the ESA was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause
either because of the statute's significant non-economic
purposes or because it was overly broad in reaching non-
commercial activities. Rejecting Rancho Viejo's two-pronged
contention that a statute must be directed primarily at an
economic purpose to survive Commerce Clause review and that
the ESA fails that test because its real purpose is the non-
economic goal of preserving biodiversity, the District of
Columbia Circuit concluded that the Commerce Clause
authorizes statutes having multiple purposes as long as
economic regulation is a significant component of the
328 See Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1071 (discussing SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167, 171-
72 (2001) (interpreting term 'navigable waters" in 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) to exclude
isolated, intrastate waters and wetlands)).
329 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173.
330 See Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1071-73.
3' See GDF, 326 F.3d 622, 634 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, No. 01-51099,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 3933 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2004) (en banc); infra notes 381-84 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 69:3
2004] REGULATING INTRASTATE ENDANGERED SPECIES 977
legislation.332 Additionally, the court declined the plaintiffs
"overbreadth" argument that "[blecause the ESA's prohibition
on takings applies as much to a hiker's 'casual walk in the
woods' as to the commercial activities of a real estate company
... the statute cannot constitutionally be applied to its taking
of arroyo toads."333 Questioning the validity of the plaintiffs
"hiker" argument for a statute that primarily regulates
commercial development, the court determined that the
plaintiff could not raise the hiker hypothetical because its case
involved commercial development," and because Lopez had
stated that "where a general regulatory statute bears a
substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of
individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence. ""'
In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Ginsburg agreed
with the majority that the "large-scale residential development
that is the take in this case clearly does affect interstate
commerce."" He asserted, nonetheless, that Lopez "requires...
a logical stopping point to our rationale for upholding the
constitutionality of the exercise of the Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause here challenged."337 Accordingly, Chief
Judge Ginsburg argued, "Just as important, however, the lone
hiker in the woods, or the homeowner who moves dirt in order
332 See Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1073-76; see generally Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note
3, at 1237-43 (arguing most statutes have multiple purposes).
33 See Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1077-78.
3M See id. at 1077-78.
335 See id. at 1077 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (quoting Maryland
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n. 27 (1968)) (emphasis omitted).
336 Id. at 1080 (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring).
37 Id. (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("[I1f we
were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity
by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate."), United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000), and United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1455-56(6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J., dissenting in part) ("[T]he rationale offered to support the
constitutionality of the statute ... has a logical stopping point, so that the rationale is
not so broad as to regulate on a similar basis all human endeavors, especially those
traditionally regulated by the states.")). See generally Nagle, supra note 8, at 196-204
(arguing Lopez suggests Congress may not satisfy substantial effects on interstate
commerce standard under Commerce Clause by using overly broad aggregations such
as hypothetical Earth Preservation Act prohibiting harm to any natural object). Chief
Judge Ginsburg's argument echoes Professor Nagle's argument that Lopez requires a
statute based on the Commerce Clause to have a logical stopping point involving
significant commercial activity. In the case of the ESA, Professor Nagle and Chief
Judge Ginsburg each argue that the statute may regulate commercial development
that "takes" endangered species, but not a lone hiker. See Nagle, supra noteD8, at 211-
14 (arguing people trampling endangered flies or their habitat by walking in the area
are beyond the scope of legitimate Commerce Clause legislation).
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to landscape his property, though he takes the toad, does not
affect interstate commerce."" Chief Judge Ginsburg contended
that this limitation in reading the ESA was essential because
"[w]ithout this limitation, the Government could regulate as a
take any kind of activity, regardless whether that activity had
any connection with interstate commerce."" ' He did not
consider whether hikers or homeowners engaging in
landscaping could in the aggregate significantly affect
interstate commerce, or when, as Lopez stated, a statute might
regulate de minimis activities as part of a general regulatory
scheme."'
Additionally, the Viejo court agreed with the Fourth
Circuit's Gibbs decision that regulation of endangered species
is a national issue and that the ESA does not infringe on an
area of traditional state regulation."' In footnotes, the Viejo
court noted Judge Wald's arguments regarding biodiversity4 '
and the prevention of destructive interstate competition," but
did not rely upon them. Implicitly, the Viejo court suggested
that in light of Lopez's strongly economic interpretation of the
commerce power, the stronger rationale for justifying Section
9's prohibition against taking commercially insignificant
intrastate species was Judge Henderson's regulation of
commercial development reasoning instead of her protecting
ecosystems argument or Judge Wald's arguments.
38 Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1080 (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring).
339 Id.
340 "[W]here a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to
commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute
is of no consequence." See id. at 1077 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n. 27 (1968))).
41 Id. at 1078-80 (discussing Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 499-505 (4th Cir.
2000)); see generally Mank, supra note 3, at 770-82 (arguing Gibbs is consistent with
Lopez, Morrison and SWANCC because ESA appropriately regulates endangered
species, which are subject of national concern and not traditional state regulation).
34 Id. at 1069 n.5 (citing NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1050 (Wald, J.)) ("There is ESA
legislative history that supports the other primary rationale relied upon in NAHB - the
effect of the loss of biodiversity on interstate commerce.").
343 Id. at 1069-70 n.7 (citing NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1054-56 (Wald, J.), and Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, (1981)) ("Application of
the ESA to habitat degradation has a further impact on interstate commerce by
removing' the incentives for states "to adopt lower standards of endangered species
protection in order to attract development," thereby preventing a destructive "race to
the bottom.").
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E. Rehearing En Banc Denied: Judges Sentelle and Roberts
Dissent
On July 22, 2003, the District of Columbia Circuit by a
seven-to-two vote denied Rancho Viejo's request for a rehearing
en banc in a per curiam decision without an opinion. 4 In
separate dissenting opinions, Judges Sentelle and Roberts each
cited GDF in arguing that the emphasis on commercial
development rather than the toad was inconsistent with the
Lopez and Morrison decisions." In his dissenting opinion,
Judge Sentelle reiterated the argument in his NAHB dissent
that the NAHB decision was wrongly decided in light of Lopez
and contended that the Viejo decision was even more clearly
wrong in the wake of Morrison's further emphasis on the
primarily economic nature of the Commerce Clause.'
According to Judge Sentelle, the toad was clearly not an article
of commerce and did not substantially affect interstate
commerce. 7 He further maintained that the FWS could not
regulate the residential development under the ESA because it
was too far removed from the statute's central concern with
endangered species.' Additionally, he argued neither the land
preparation that might lead to the destruction of the toad nor
the construction of the homes themselves were sufficiently
interstate and commercial in nature to qualify for regulation
under the Commerce Clause - a very narrow interpretation of
the Clause raising possible similarities to the pre-1937
understanding.'
Judge Roberts agreed with Judge Sentelle that the Viejo
decision was wrong to emphasize the relationship between
residential development and interstate commerce rather than
determining whether the statute's true focus, the endangered
toad, has a substantial impact on interstate commerce." In his
view, under the Viejo court's analysis any activity remotely
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (en banc),
cert. denied, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1652 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2004).
345 Id. at 1158-60 (Sentelle, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc);
id. at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
346 Id. at 1158-60 (Sentelle, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
" Id. at 1158-59.
34 Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1159 (Sentelle, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
.9 Id.
350 Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en
banc).
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connected to a commercial activity could be regulated under
the Commerce Clause, an outcome that was inconsistent with
Lopez and Morrison's emphasis on the limits to Congress's
commerce power."1 Indeed, as the GDF decision pointed out,
Judge Roberts contended that under the Viejo court's
commercial development rationale the statutes that the
Supreme Court struck down in Lopez and Morrison arguably
would have been constitutional as long as they were applied
only to large-scale commercial actors, but he maintained such a
result was plainly inconsistent with those two Court
decisions.52 While acknowledging that the Viejo decision was
consistent with NAHB, Judge Roberts argued that en banc
review was appropriate in light of the conflict with the Fifth
Circuit's decision in GDF.3 ' Unlike Judge Sentelle, Judge
Roberts explicitly stated that there might be alternative
grounds other than the commercial development rationale for
sustaining the ESA's regulation of the toad, perhaps the
reasoning in GDF.M
VI. GDF: AGGREGATING ALL ENDANGERED SPECIES
In GDF Realty Investments v. Norton," the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the FWS regulations protecting intrastate
spiders and beetles were constitutional under the Commerce
Clause, despite these species' lack of commercial value, because
endangered species as a whole have substantial impacts on
interstate commerce. Moreover, the court held that it was
appropriate to aggregate the impacts of the spiders and beetles
at issue with other endangered species because of the
"interdependence of all species." The GDF court did not accept
the reasoning advanced by the Secretary of Interior in her
briefs, which the District of Columbia Circuit subsequently
adopted in Viejo, that the economic impact of the commercial
development was the relevant locus.
The Fifth Circuit's approach of aggregating all
endangered species would potentially protect more endangered
species than Viejo's commercial development analysis. Under
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Id.
'55 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, No. 01-51099, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3933 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2004) (en banc).
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GDF's aggregation approach, the government could regulate a
lone hiker or landscaping homeowner who harms any
endangered species, even if the species is commercially
insignificant, because harm to any endangered species
regardless of the size or commercial value of the regulated
activity threatens the sensitive interdependence of ecosystems,
which in turn may cause significant damage to interstate
commerce. By contrast, Viejo's rationale may not reach the lone
hiker or landscaping homeowner hypotheticals;16 Chief Judge
Ginsburg argued that a commercial development analysis
would definitely exclude those examples and ought to do so
because Lopez implies that federal regulation has a logical
stopping point when the regulated activity no longer
substantially affects interstate commerce. 57
A. The FWS Protects the Cave Species
In GDF, the court referred to six species of
subterranean, cave-dwelling invertebrates listed as endangered
under Section 4 of the ESA."u The Cave Species are found only
in underground portions of Travis and Williamson Counties,
Texas.5 The FWS listed these Cave Species as endangered
because "their extremely small, vulnerable, and limited
habitats are within an area that can be expected to experience
continued pressures from economic and population growth."' It
is undisputed that there is no commercial market for the Cave
35 See generally Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1077-78 (suggesting that ESA prohibition
against taking endangered species might apply to a lone hiker because a statute that
generally has substantial relationship to commerce may include isolated examples that
do not, but declining to address "loner hiker" hypothetical posed by plaintiff because
the plaintiffs large-scale commercial housing development was not similar to lone
hiker hypothetical); supra notes 19-21, 41and infra notes 338-40 and accompanying
text.
357 Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1080 (Ginsburg, C.J., concurring).
358 The six species referred to by the court were the Bee Creek Cave
Harvestman, the Bone Cave Harvestman, the Tooth Cave Pseudoscorpion, the Tooth
Cave Spider, the Tooth Cave Ground Beetle and the Kretschmarr Cave Mold Beetle.
See GDF, 326 F.3d at 625; ESA, § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (requiring Secretary to list
endangered species); 53 Fed. Reg. 36,029 (16 Sept. 1988) (listing 5 species); 58 Fed.
Reg. 43,818 (18 Aug. 1993) (listing sixth species). The Bee Creek Cave Harvestman, the
Bone Cave Harvestman, and the Tooth Cave Pseudoscorpion are subterranean, eyeless
arachnids that have four pairs of legs and no antennae; they vary in size from 1.4 to 4
mm. GDF, 326 F.3d at 625. The Tooth Cave Spider is a subterranean arachnid with
eyes and measures 1.6 mm in length. The Tooth Cave Ground Beetle and the
Kretschmarr Cave Mold Beetle are subterranean insects, the latter being eyeless; they
range in size from 3 to 8 mm. Id.
O9 GDF, 326 F.3d at 625.
Id. (quoting 53 Fed. Reg. at 36,032).
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Species."' However, scientists visited Texas to study the Cave
Species and have published at least fourteen scientific articles
regarding them. Museums in New York, California,
Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Kentucky have acquired
specimens."
The Purcell brothers and GDF Realty Investments, Inc.
owned 216 acres in Travis County, Texas, near the City of
Austin, which contained several caves in which the endangered
species lived." In 1989, the FWS notified the Purcells that
their commercial development plans for the property, including
installing water lines and other utilities, might result in the
taking of Cave Species in violation of Section 9 of the ESA.36 To
address the FWS's concerns, the Purcells deeded approximately
six acres of the property, which included various caves and
sinkholes in which the species were known to live, to Texas
Systems of Natural Laboratories, Inc., a non-profit
environmental organization.36 The Purcells also followed the
FWS's recommendation to construct gates covering the most
ecologically sensitive caves.
These steps, however, were not enough to convince the
FWS that the remainder of the land could be developed without
harming the Cave Species. In 1991, the Purcells contracted to
sell a portion of the property, but the potential purchaser
declined to purchase the land when the FWS refused to
guarantee that it would allow future development of the
property.
In 1997, the Purcells attempted to obtain incidental
take permits under Section 10(a) of the ESA, 9 which would
have allowed them to develop the property and take a limited
number of endangered creatures if they submitted a plan that
guaranteed the overall preservation of the species.Y Their
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Id.
31 GDF, 326 F.3d at 624-25.
365 Id.
36 Id. at 625.
367 Id.
36 Id. at 626. Whether the inability of the Purcells to sell their property might
constitute a regulatory taking is beyond the scope of this article and would likely
depend on whether they could develop some portion of the property. See Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
30 See GDF, 326 F.3d at 626 (discussing incidental take permit under 16
U.S.C. § 1539(a)) (2000).
370 See id. (discussing 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B) (2000)).
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permit applications stated they planned to develop a shopping
center, including a Wal-Mart store, a residential subdivision,
and commercial office buildings."' In 1998, because it decided
that the deeded preserves were inadequate to protect the Cave
Species, the FWS told the Purcells that it would deny their
permit applications, although it never issued formal denials."2
In 1999, the Purcells filed suit, alleging that the ESA's
Section 9 take provision, as applied to the Cave Species, was
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause in light of Lopez.
The plaintiffs later amended their claim to include Morrison."'
In 2001, the district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants."4 Because of the plaintiffs' extensive proposed
commercial development plans for the property, the district
court concluded that it would be "hard-pressed to find a more
direct link to interstate commerce than a Wal-Mart.""
B. Rejecting the District Court's Commercial Development
Approach
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit summarized the district
court's opinion as "primarily consider[ing] plaintiffs'
commercial motivations that would underlie the takes" rather
than the takes themselves.37' The Fifth Circuit disagreed with
the district court's approach, stating: "[W]e conclude that the
scope of inquiry is primarily whether the expressly regulated
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, i.e., whether
takes, be they of the Cave Species or of all endangered species
in the aggregate, have the substantial effect."377
The Fifth Circuit applied the four-part test used in
Lopez and Morrison to determine whether that intrastate
activity substantially affected interstate commerce. The second
factor was easy to resolve. The Fifth Circuit observed that the
"ESA's take provision has no jurisdictional requirement that
might otherwise limit its application to species bearing some
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 Id.
374 GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 169 F. Supp. 2d 648 (W.D. Tex.
2001); see also GDF, 326 F.3d at 626.
375 GDF, 326 F.3d at 627 (quoting GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton,
169 F. Supp. 2d at 662).
376 Id. at 633 (emphasis in original).
377 Id. (emphasis in original).
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relationship to interstate commerce."378 Moreover, the list of
protected species is not fixed, but the FWS adds to or subtracts
from the list of species protected by the take provision."'
In addressing the first Lopez factor, determining
whether the activity was economic, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that the Supreme Court had not provided a clear
test for which activities regulated by a statute are the proper
focus of the analysis.' The Fifth Circuit interpreted dicta in
SWANCC, however, as raising doubts about focusing on the
developer's commercial plans rather than on the actual impact
of regulated natural resources." Building on SWANCC's dicta,
the Fifth Circuit argued that under all three of Lopez's
categories, the primary focus in determining congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause is on how the "object of
regulation relates to interstate commerce: channels,
instrumentalities, or activities.""2 The object of regulation is the
principal focus, the court contended, because "[nieither the
plain language of the Commerce Clause, nor judicial decisions
construing it, suggest that, concerning substantial effect vel
non, Congress may regulate activity (here, Cave Species takes)
solely because non-regulated conduct (here, commercial
development) by the actor engaged in the regulated activity
will have some connection to interstate commerce. " M
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit in GDF concluded it was
inappropriate for the district court to place the primary focus
on the developer's commercial plans rather than on taking
Cave Species.m In other words, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
courts should examine a developer's project only to the extent
that it harmed endangered or threatened species rather than
focusing on how much money the developer's project would
generate.
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
district court's commercial activities approach was inconsistent
with Lopez and Morrison because "[tIo accept the district
court's analysis would allow application of otherwise
378 GDF, 326 F.3d at 632-33.
319 See id. at 633 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c) (2000) (requiring publication in
Federal Register of listed species and review of list at least once every five years)).
o Id. at 633.
" Id. at 633-34.
32 Id. 634.
GDF, 326 F.3d at 634.
' Id. at 634-35.
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unconstitutional statutes to commercial actors, but not to non-
commercial actors."38 The Fifth Circuit argued that "looking
primarily beyond the regulated activity in such a manner
would 'effectually obliterate' the limiting purpose of the
Commerce Clause." The court contended that under the
district court's approach "the facial challenges in Lopez and
Morrison would have failed."" As an example, the GDF court
claimed that under the district court's analysis "regulation of
gun possession near schools, at issue in Lopez, would arguably
pass constitutional muster as applied to a possessor who was a
significant gun salesman. Therefore, § 922(q)(1)(A) could not
have been facially unconstitutional."" Additionally, the Fifth
Circuit claimed that "the Violence Against Women Act, at issue
in Morrison, would arguably have been a constitutional
exercise of Congressional power if it were used to prosecute a
person who committed violence against women and then sold a
substantial number of videotapes of the encounter in interstate
markets. It too would have withstood a facial attack.""'
Accordingly, under the district court's analysis, the GDF court
reasoned that "[t]here would be no limit to Congress's authority
to regulate intrastate activities, so long as those subjected to
the regulation were entities which had an otherwise
substantial connection to interstate commerce."" The Fifth
Circuit concluded that "[s]uch results, of course, run contrary
to Lopez and Morrison.""' Some commentators, however, might
question whether the relatively case-specific holdings in those
two Supreme Court decisions provide clear answers to the
hypotheticals posed by the Fifth Circuit in attacking the
district court's reasoning.
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that in NAHB and
Gibbs, the District of Columbia Circuit and the Fourth Circuit,
respectively, had examined to some extent the actor's "general
conduct," including the impact of its commercial plans.
However, the Fifth Circuit argued that those courts had relied
on other factors as well. The GDF court argued that in "NAHB
and Gibbs, however, the actor's general conduct was not the
38 Id. at 634.
Id. (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
17 Id. at 635.
GDF, 326 F.3d at 635.
389 Id.
390 Id. at 634 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
391 Id. at 635.
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sole basis for finding economic activity or a substantial effect
on interstate commerce."" In NAHB, Judge Wald's "main
opinion" had approved the ESA on two grounds: first, "as a
valid regulation of the channels of interstate commerce," and
second, because taking the flies substantially affected
interstate commerce.393 While her substantial effects approach
focused on all endangered species, the Fifth Circuit conceded
that her "channels of interstate commerce" analysis had
examined the actor's conduct, but argued that "[t]here is, of
course, good reason to look beyond the regulated activity to
determine whether such channels are being used; whether an
actor deals in these channels is directly relevant.""
According to the Fifth Circuit, Judge Henderson's
NAHB concurrence had focused on the impact of takes on
biodiversity, and how harm to ecosystems substantially
affected interstate commerce.395  The Fifth Circuit de-
emphasized the importance of the hospital and road
construction in Judge Henderson's opinion, stating that she
"briefly noted, however, that the regulation plainly affected
interstate commerce because '[it] relates to both the proposed
redesigned traffic intersection and the hospital it is intended to
serve ... ."'" The Fifth Circuit made the questionable assertion
that Judge Henderson's discussion of the traffic intersections
related to the traditional channels of interstate commerce
analysis rather than the substantial effects analysis used by
the district court in GDF:
Of course, the ESA regulation at issue in NAHB did not relate to
traffic intersections; it related to fly takes. Judge Henderson relied,
in part, on the following language from Heart of Atlanta Motel to
support her conclusion: "The facilities and instrumentalities used to
carry on this commerce such as railroads, truck lines, ships, rivers,
and even highways are also subject to congressional regulation, so
far as is necessary to keep interstate traffic upon fair and equal
terms." 379 U.S. at 271 (emphasis added). This statement provides
an example of Congress' power to regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce, rather than those activities having a
397
substantial effect on interstate commerce.
392 Id.
391 GDF, 326 F.3d at 635.
394 Id.
395 Id.
39 Id. (quoting NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1059 (Henderson, J., concurring)).
397 Id. at 636 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 271).
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To the extent that Judge Henderson's NAHB concurrence
relied on the substantial effects caused by the construction on
interstate commerce, the Fifth Circuit agreed with Judge
Sentelle's dissent in NAHB that such reliance was improper
because the Commerce Clause only authorizes regulations that
directly affect interstate commerce and does not support
regulation of non-commercial activities that may have some
indirect impacts on interstate commerce.398 The Fifth Circuit
concluded: "Judge Henderson did not rely primarily on the
commercial development, but instead analyzed the expressly
regulated activity - the takes' effect on biodiversity.""
Discussing Gibbs, the GDF court acknowledged that the
Fourth Circuit, in concluding that regulating wolf takes
substantially impacted interstate commerce, relied to some
extent on the regulation's impact on farmers rather than the
economic impact of taking wolves." The Fifth Circuit
determined that "Gibbs held primarily, however, that the
expressly regulated activity - red wolf takes, regardless of
farmers' motivations - was economic in nature." ' The GDF
court concluded: "In the light of the successful facial challenges
in Lopez and Morrison and the emphasis our court and sister
circuits have placed on the economic nature vel non of the
expressly regulated activity, the district court erred in looking
primarily to plaintiffs' commercial motivations." °2
C. Aggregating All Endangered Species Is Appropriate
After setting its focus on the takes instead of
commercial development, the Fifth Circuit next addressed
whether Cave Species takes have a substantial impact on
interstate commerce. The FWS argued that the Cave Species
have two significant impacts on interstate commerce: first, "the
'substantial' scientific interest generated by the Cave Species,
and second, their possible future commercial benefits.""' Unlike
the far more commercially valuable red wolves, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that for the Cave Species, "any connection
between takes and impact on the scientific travel or publication
198 GDF, 326 F.3d at 636.
399 Id.
400 Id.
401 Id.
402 Id.
41 GDF, 326 F.3d at 637 (emphasis in original).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
industries is . . negligible. Under Morrison's fourth
consideration, any claim that the connection rises to a
'substantial relationship' is far too attenuated to pass
muster." 4 In response to the FWS's arguments about the
potential future commercial value of the Cave Species, the GDF
court determined: "The possibility of future substantial effects
of the Cave Species on interstate commerce, through industries
such as medicine, is simply too hypothetical and attenuated
from the regulation in question to pass constitutional
muster." o5
Alternatively, if the Cave Species themselves do not
have a significant impact on interstate commerce, the FWS
argued that Cave Species takes may be aggregated with those
of all other endangered species and that the aggregate impact
of all takes on interstate commerce is substantial. 0 The
plaintiffs acknowledged that the aggregate effect of all takings
of every endangered species would have a substantial impact
on interstate commerce. 7 They contended, however, that such
aggregation is inappropriate because Cave Species takes are
completely non-economic in character and are not an essential
part of a regulatory scheme, as required by Lopez.0
In determining whether it was appropriate to aggregate
Cave Species takes with those of all other endangered species,
the GDF court observed that "Lopez and Morrison instruct
courts to consider, inter alia, the activity's economic or
commercial nature."49 Even under a lenient definition of
economic activity, the Fifth Circuit concluded "Cave Species
takes are neither economic nor commercial. There is no market
for them; any future market is conjecture."41 0 The GDF court
questioned the FWS's aggregation argument since "[an
activity cannot be aggregated based solely on the fact that,
post-aggregation, the sum of the activities will have a
substantial effect on commerce. This would vitiate Lopez and
Morrison's seeming requirement that the intrastate instance of
404 Id.
405 Id. at 637-38 (emphasis in original) (citing U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at
612).
401 Id. at 638.
407 Id. at 632.
4o GDF, 326 F.3d at 632.
409 Id. at 638.
410 Id.
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activity be commercial.'H A stronger argument for aggregation,
however, was that the ESA's prohibition against taking Cave
Species was part of a broader regulation of activity, but the
Fifth Circuit observed that non-economic, intrastate activities
may be aggregated under this rationale only if they are
"'essential' to an economic regulatory scheme's efficacy ....
Nonetheless, in determining that aggregation was
appropriate, the Fifth Circuit first concluded that the "ESA's
protection of endangered species is economic in nature" because
the ESA's legislative history refers to the "'incalculable' value
of the genetic heritage that might be lost absent regulation."413
Some commentators, however, might question whether the
legislative history's reference to value was really about
economics or might refer instead to aesthetic, moral, or other
types of value. Additionally, the GDF court determined that "it
is obvious that the majority of takes would result from
economic activity."4 "  Furthermore, the ESA's regulatory
scheme does not interfere with a traditional area of state
regulation because regulation of endangered species is a shared
subject of national interest.415
Second, the GDF court concluded that regulating Cave
Species takes was an essential component of the ESA's broader
regulatory scheme.4" The FWS argued that allowing the taking
of some endangered species would undermine Congress's goal
of protecting the chain of life and the "interdependent web" of
all species by allowing "piece-meal extinctions. 17 There is
significant scientific evidence that many endangered or
threatened species that possess little commercial value perform
critical "ecosystem services" such as decomposing organic
411 Id.
411 GDF, 326 F.3d at 639 (emphasis in original).
413 Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-412, at 4).
414 See id. at 639 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2000) ("various species of fish,
wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence
of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and
conservation")).
415 Id.; see also Rancho Viejo LLC v. Norton 323 F.3d 1062, 1078-80 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (determining ESA's regulation of endangered species is subject of national
concern and not traditional state regulation); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 499-505
(4th Cir. 2000) (same); see generally Mank, supra note 3, at 770-82 (arguing Gibbs is
consistent with Lopez, Morrison and SWANCC because ESA appropriately regulates
endangered species, which are subject of national concern and not traditional state
regulation).
416 GDF, 326 F.3d at 639-40.
417 Id. at 640.
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matter, renewing soil, mitigating floods, purifying air and
water, or partially stabilizing climatic variation."8 Relying on
credible evidence that the taking of endangered or threatened
species often has significant impacts on commercially valuable
species and ecosystems, the Fifth Circuit concluded that "the
link between species loss and a substantial commercial effect is
not attenuated," that "regulated takes under ESA do affect
interstate commerce," and, despite the absence of an express
jurisdictional element in the statute, that "the ESA's take
provision is limited to instances which 'have an explicit
connection with or effect on interstate commerce.' 4.9
Because the statute is limited only to endangered and
threatened species, the Fifth Circuit concluded that its "holding
will not allow Congress to regulate general land use or wildlife
preservation" in violation of the rationale of Lopez and
Morrison that statutes are valid under the Commerce Clause
only if they have a limiting principle. 0 The GDF court
determined that an appropriate limiting principle existed
because the statute is limited to endangered species that would
likely be affected by a small number of takes, and does not
apply to abundant species."'
D. Judge Dennis's Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Judge Dennis offered
additional reasons for concluding that the ESA was
constitutional under the Commerce Clause. Judge Dennis
argued that the Supreme Court and lower courts had
recognized since the Darby decision in 1941 that "both
commercial and noncommercial activity may be regulated by
Congress if the regulation is an essential or integral part of a
larger comprehensive scheme properly regulating activity
substantially affecting interstate commerce."4 " He argued that
418 See John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species
with Hotspots Legislation, 2 HASTING L.J. 1149, 1164-65 (2001) (discussing role of
many commercially insignificant species in achieving ecosystem survival); Mank, supra
note 3, at 786 (same).
419 GDF, 326 F.3d at 640 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12) (emphasis in
original and internal quotations omitted).
420 See id. at 640 (discussing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13, and quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 564 ("We rejected these ... arguments because they would permit Congress
to 'regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime
421 Id. at 640.
422 Id. at 642-43 (Dennis, J., concurring).
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the ESA is a comprehensive and integrated statute for
protecting endangered and threatened species and their
essential ecosystems.4 ' To conserve the ecosystems in which
commercial species dwell, Congress has the authority under
the Commerce Clause to protect non-commercial, intrastate
endangered species as an essential means of protecting
commercially valuable ecosystems and species that have a
substantial impact on interstate commerce.4 4 While some might
question whether preserving the Cave Species is integral to
protecting commercial species, Judge Dennis argued that
deference to the statutory scheme is appropriate because "the
interrelationship of commercial and non-commercial species is
so complicated, intertwined, and not yet fully understood that
Congress acted rationally in seeking to protect all endangered
or threatened species from extinction or harm."2' Because of
these complex interrelationships, he concluded that it is
appropriate to aggregate the impacts of all takes of endangered
species, including the Cave Species, "because such regulation is
essential to the efficacy of - that is, the regulation is necessary
and proper to - the ESA's comprehensive scheme to preserve
the nation's genetic heritage and the 'incalculable' value
inherent to that scarce natural resource, and because that
regulatory scheme has a very substantial impact on interstate
commerce."42  Elaborating on the majority opinion, Judge
Dennis's concurring opinion helpfully explained why the ESA is
a comprehensive statute that requires protection of all
endangered species, both commercially valuable and
insignificant, to conserve their value for interstate commerce.
VII. CONCLUSION: COURTS SHOULD FOLLOW GDF AND REJECT
VIEJO
A. Regulating Commercial Motivations or Endangered
Species
Both the GDF and Viejo courts tried to follow the
general principle in Lopez and Morrison that congressional
423 GDF, 326 F.3d at 641 (Dennis, J., concurring).
424 2d. at 641 (Dennis, J., concurring).
425 Id. at 643-44 (Dennis, J., concurring).
426 Id. at 644 (Dennis, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Tiefer, After Morrison,
Can Congress Preserve Environmental Laws from Commerce Clause Challenge?, 30
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10888 (2000)).
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authority under the Commerce Clause must have some limits,
but they disagreed over whether those limits should adhere to
the means or the ends of regulation under the ESA. Because
the Lopez and Morrison courts failed to provide a clear test for
distinguishing between economic activities within the
commerce power and non-economic activities outside its scope,
lower courts have struggled with deciding whether various
types of legislation such as the ESA are constitutional under
the Commerce Clause. 7 The Supreme Court's Commerce
Clause jurisprudence has sometimes emphasized either the
means of regulation, such as regulation of the channels of
commerce, or the ends of regulation, in SWANCC arguably the
isolated wetlands and waters, rather than the construction
activities that affect them.2 8 There are plausible arguments for
emphasizing either the ESA's end of protecting endangered
species or its means of regulating commercial development. 9
Nevertheless, while regulating commercial activities is
an important component of the ESA, the GDF court properly
emphasized that Congress's ultimate goal in enacting the 1973
amendments was to protect as many endangered species as
possible, and that considering their aggregate benefits best
accomplishes that goal in a manner consistent with federalism
values.3  Furthermore, although focusing on commercial
development in some ways is more consistent with Lopez and
Morrison's emphasis that the Commerce Clause concerns
commercial activities, the Viejo court's commercial motivations
approach is potentially too broad because it would allow the
federal government to regulate any activity indirectly
connected to a commercial activity even if the indirect activity
is traditionally regulated by state and local governments.'
Conversely, the GDF's aggregation of both commercial and
non-commercial endangered species does raise questions about
the limits of aggregating non-commercial activities, but is
427 See Seinfeld, supra note 22, at 1276-87 (discussing difficulties lower courts
have encountered in distinguishing economic from non-economic activities); see also
Mank, supra note 3, at 738, 741 (observing line between economic and non-economic
activities is often unclear); Mank, supra note 3, 770-72 (arguing line between national
and traditional state areas of regulation raises many problems).
428 See Christopher H. Schroeder, Environmental Law, Congress, and the
Court's New Federalism Doctrine, 78 IND. L.J. 413, 437-41 (2003) (arguing modern
judicial conception of commerce power can reach either means or ends or both).
429 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 210 (stating "either the means or the ends
should be able to provide the requisite connection to interstate commerce").
430 See supra notes 49, 89-96, 416-26 and accompanying text.
431 See supra notes 39-40, 345-52, 381-91 and accompanying text.
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ultimately more compatible with Lopez and Morrison's
federalist principles because the aggregation is limited to only
endangered species - species for which there is a long history of
concurrent federal regulation and for which the federal
government seeks to achieve recovery and ultimate return to
state control."2
B. Assessing Viejo
Building on Judge Henderson's concurring opinion in
NAHB, the Viejo court focused on the ESA's regulation of
commercial activities that are the means of harming
endangered species and their habitat. Because large-scale
commercial development of land generally has significant
effects on interstate commerce and is economic in nature, the
Viejo development approach has the advantage of emphasizing
activities that are clearly within the scope of the Commerce
Clause, unlike regulation of commercially insignificant species
such as the fly or Cave Species." The Viejo court relied most
heavily on Heart of Atlanta Motel, upholding civil rights
legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in intrastate public
accommodations on the ground that the establishments in the
aggregate substantially affected interstate commerce because
most of the clients were out-of-state travelers." Similarly, the
Viejo decision claimed it was appropriate to consider the
interstate commercial impacts of a real estate development
threatening endangered species in order to justify the ESA's
regulation of intrastate endangered species that have no
economic impacts themselves."'
432 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (1994) (defining "conservation" as "the use of all
methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this
chapter are no longer necessary"); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d at 502-03 (discussing
ESA's scheme for shared federal and state authority over endangered species); Mank,
supra note 3, at 780-81 (arguing ESA does not violate federalism principles in Lopez
and Morrison because ultimate goal is recovery of species and return to state control);
infra notes 457, 472 and accompanying text.
433 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 189-91, 208-15 (discussing choice of activity
problem relating to Endangered Species Act and arguing that commercial activities
affecting endangered species may be regulated under the Commerce Clause).
434 Id. at 261.
435 See Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1075-76 & n.19 (stating Heart of Atlanta Motel was
decided using both channels of commerce analysis and substantial effects analysis and
supports use of commercial impacts to justify non-economic regulation); Nagle, supra
note 8, at 190 (discussing implications of Heart of Atlanta Motel); see Morrison, 529
U.S. at 610 (implying Heart of Atlanta Motel decision allowing civil rights regulation of
public accommodations was decided in part because motel had substantial effects on
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However, like the Fifth Circuit in GDF, this Article
asserts that the Viejo court's approach is both under- and over-
inclusive, and in its breadth weakens the federalist
underpinnings of Lopez and Morrison. For example, the Viejo
court's focus on economic activity could allow Congress to
regulate wedding ceremonies, which are not economic activities
in themselves, if they result in the renting of a large hotel or
reception hall that has significant impacts on interstate
commerce. This is so even though Lopez and Morrison
emphasized that family law and marriage are traditional areas
of state regulation.43 Furthermore, a broad interpretation of the
rationale in Viejo would arguably allow the federal government
to usurp local land use planning and zoning functions as long
as it regulated only commercial actors that affect interstate
commerce. However, that result appears to be inconsistent
with SWANCC's dictum that states possess "traditional and
primary power over land and water use."43" In sum, Viejo's
economic activity analysis would arguably allow Congress to
regulate any non-economic activity affected by a commercial
actor even if the regulated activity was traditionally regulated
by states.
Additionally, the commercial activity approach is
potentially under-inclusive. In his concurring opinion in Viejo,
Chief Judge Ginsburg argued that the commercial development
approach was consistent with Lopez and Morrison's emphasis
on limiting the commerce power because the commercial
development approach would not reach activities that have
little commercial significance, such as a lone hiker or
landscaping homeowner. He implied that the commerce power
should not apply to hobbyists, but only to commercial
interstate commerce); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (same); supra notes 142-43, 264-65, 401,
440 and accompanying text. Similarly, in Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court concluded
that the government could forbid discrimination by a local, intrastate restaurant
because its substantial purchases from out-of-state sources substantially affected
interstate commerce. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. 294, 296, 300-01 (1964); Viejo, 323 F.3d
at 1076 n.19 (stating Katzenbach was decided using both channels of commerce
analysis and substantial effects analysis); Nagle, supra note 8, at 190 (discussing
implications of Katzenbach v. McClung).
436 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-18 (2000) (characterizing
family law as traditional area of state regulation); Schroeder, supra note 428, at 442-44
(discussing marriage and divorce as traditional areas of state regulation); William Van
Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the
Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE. L.J. 769, 795 (same).
437 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174 (citing Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson
Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) ("[Riegulation of land use [is] a function
traditionally performed by local governments.")).
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enterprises. Yet, like the sole farmer raising wheat for personal
consumption in Wickard, the lone hiker or landscaping
homeowner may pose substantial dangers if exempted from
ESA regulation across-the-board. At its worst, Judge
Ginsburg's Viejo concurrence would arguably revive the
discredited pre-1937 distinction between direct and indirect
effects in which the Court had allowed Congress to only
regulate activities that directly affected interstate commerce,
such as interstate sales of goods, but excluded intrastate
manufacturing because it only indirectly affected commerce
after the manufactured good entered the market. '38
By allowing only regulation of large-scale commercial
activities that have direct effects on interstate commerce, the
commercial activities approach in Viejo or Judge Henderson's
concurring opinion in NAHB would too narrowly interpret
legitimate congressional authority to regulate activities that in
the aggregate substantially affect interstate commerce. While a
single hiker or homeowner is likely to have little impact on an
endangered species, unless it is down to its very last few
members, the aggregate impact of all hikers or landscaping
homeowners could ultimately destroy many endangered
species. For example, Professor Nagle has suggested that
persons driving Off-Road Vehicles (ORVs) that may harm
endangered species or their critical habitat are not within the
scope of the Commerce Clause because the individual impact of
any user is so small and the activity is a hobby rather than a
commercial venture.439 Yet ORVs in the aggregate may well
438 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (concluding
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act exceeded commerce power because mining was
intrastate activity); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding Commerce
Clause did not authorize child labor laws because intrastate manufacturing is not
interstate commerce even though products later entered interstate commerce),
overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co.,156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding sugar manufacturers were outside Sherman Act
because sugar manufacturing was intrastate activity even if sugar later entered
interstate commerce); Schapiro & Buzbee, supra note 3, at 1210-11; supra notes 181,
211, 349 and accompanying text. In some pre-1937 cases, however, especially those
involving public carriers such as railroads, the Court concluded the Commerce Clause
authorized limited regulation of intrastate commerce where interstate and intrastate
commerce were so blended together that regulation of interstate commerce required
incidental regulation of intrastate commerce. See, e.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S.
342 (1914).
4,9 See Nagle, supra note 8, at 211-12. Moreover, Professor Nagle suggests
that the ORV industry as a whole is beyond regulation, a more debatable point because
the sale of the vehicles and their transportation across state lines arguably has
substantial effects on interstate commerce, although he argues that allowing the
transportation of such vehicles across state lines to be the basis for regulation would
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
have substantial impacts on endangered species, especially
because it is common for ORV enthusiasts to form clubs or
attend large jamborees.4" The analysis in Viejo or Judge
Henderson's concurring opinion in NAHB would arguably
exclude all small-scale commercial and social activities that do
not individually affect interstate commerce, regardless of
whether those activities may in the aggregate harm many
endangered species or their critical habitat.
The commercial activities approach would be more
acceptable if it examined the aggregate impacts of seemingly
small activities or treated them as an integral part of the
overall statute. The majority opinion in Viejo suggested that
the lone hiker might be subsumed within the statute's broader
purposes, but declined to answer the question because the facts
of the case involved a substantial commercial housing
development.441 This Article would be more comfortable with the
commercial development approach if it subsumed individually
insignificant activities that in the aggregate have a substantial
impact, but as discussed in subpart C, aggregating all
endangered species provides a generally better approach than
Viejo's commercial analysis.
C. Aggregating All Endangered Species: GDF Offers a
Better Approach
The GDF court's aggregation of all endangered species
is more appropriate under Lopez and Morrison. First, in light of
Lopez and Morrison's emphasis that aggregation is generally
appropriate for economic activities, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the "ESA's protection of endangered species is economic in
nature" because the ESA's legislative history refers to the
"'incalculable' value of the genetic heritage that might be lost
likely result in too broad a reading of the Clause to include too many activities. See id.
at 212.
440 See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir.
2002) (holding Bureau of Land Management has duty under Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 and National Environmental Policy Act to consider harm
from ORVs to public lands); see ATV Connection Magazine Website, at
http://www.atving.com/resources/clubs (listing and discussing clubs for ORV members);
Jeep Jamboree USA 2003, at http://jeepjamboreeusa.com (announcing large jamboree
for ORV users).
441 Viejo, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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absent regulation."44' Also, consistent with Viejo's emphasis on
economic activity, the GDF court likewise determined that "it
is obvious that the majority of takes would result from
economic activity."443
In criticizing Judge Wald's biodiversity4'4 and Judge
Henderson's ecosystem" arguments in NAHB, Professor Nagle
contended that aggregating all endangered species was
inappropriate because each endangered species was dissimilar,
unlike the wheat in Wickard, and that an overly broad
aggregation principle would contradict Lopez's emphasis on the
need for a limiting principle on the scope of congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause.41' The GDF court,
however, concluded that regulating Cave Species takes was an
essential component of the ESA's broader regulatory scheme."'
In TVA v. Hill,"' the Supreme Court had stated that in
enacting the ESA in 1973 "Congress was concerned [not only]
about the unknown uses that endangered species might
have[, but also] about the unforeseeable place such creatures
may have in the chain of life on this planet.""9 The FWS argued
in GDF that ignoring the taking of some endangered species
would undermine Congress's goal of protecting the chain of life
and "'interdependent web' of all species by allowing "piece-
4 GDF, 326 F.3d 622, 639 (5th Cir. 2003), reh'g denied, No. 01-51099, 2004
U.S. App. LEXIS 3933 (5th Cir. Feb. 27, 2004) (en banc) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-412,
at 4).
443 See GDF, 326 F.3d at 639 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2000) ("various
species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct as a
consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern
and conservation")).
" NAHB, 130 F.3d 1041, 1052-54 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Mank, supra note 3, at
756-57.
445 NAHB, 130 F.3d at 1058-59 (Henderson, J., concurring) (stating that "theloss of biodiversity itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem and likewise on
interstate commerce" and that "[given] the interconnectedness of species and
ecosystems, it is reasonable to conclude that the extinction of one species affects others
and their ecosystems and that the protection of a purely intrastate species . . .will
therefore substantially affect land and objects that are involved in interstate
commerce."); Mank, supra note 3, at 758-59.
446 Nagle, supra note 8, at 180, 193-202 (discussing when it is appropriate to
aggregate activities to determine their impact under Commerce Clause); see also Nagle,
supra note 8, at 186-189 (questioning ecosystem and biodiversity arguments that loss
of even commercially insignificant endangered species is likely to have substantial
adverse economic impacts and suggesting more proof of economic harm is required tojustify Endangered Species Act under Commerce Clause).
"' GDF, 326 F.3d at 639-40.
448 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
449 Id. at 178-79 (emphasis in original).
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meal extinctions."'4 This principle, in context, does have
reasonable limits. Because commercially insignificant species
often exist interdependently with more valuable species, taking
of any species will probably have important effects on
commercially valuable species and ecosystems. The Fifth
Circuit agreed that, despite the absence of an express
jurisdictional element in the statute, "the ESA's take provision
is limited to instances which 'have an explicit connection with
or effect on interstate commerce."
Furthermore, the GDF court concluded that "the link
between species loss and a substantial commercial effect is not
attenuated" because the statute is limited to endangered
species that would likely be affected by a small number of takes
and does not apply to abundant species.45 Moreover, as Judge
Dennis's concurring opinion argued, there is an additional
argument that under a deferential rational basis standard, a
standard which neither Lopez or Morrison purported to change
or overrule,4 " courts should defer to the ESA's aggregation of all
species even if there are plausible arguments that they are too
dissimilar or that their interdependency is questionable."
Further, because the statute is limited to only
endangered and threatened species, the Fifth Circuit in GDF
correctly concluded that its "holding will not allow Congress to
4o GDF, 326 F.3d at 640.
451 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12 (internal
quotations omitted)); but see Nagle, supra note 8, at 186-189, 199 (questioning
ecosystem and biodiversity arguments that loss of even commercially insignificant
endangered species is likely to have substantial adverse economic impacts and
suggesting more proof of economic harm is required to justify Endangered Species Act
under Commerce Clause).
452 GDF, 326 F.3d at 640.
451 Morrison, 529 U.S. 528, 607 (2000) (stating deferential presumption of
constitutionality standard, "Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of
Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain
showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds."); Mank, supra note 3,
at 792-93 (arguing Lopez and Morrison did not claim to overrule prior decisions
applying rational basis review to statutes challenged as exceeding congressional
commerce power and Morrison explicitly stated that there is presumption that statute
is constitutional under Commerce Clause); supra notes 42, 201-06 and accompanying
text.
454 GDF, 326 F.3d at 641 (Dennis, J., concurring); Mank, supra note 3, at 784-
93 (disagreeing with Professor Nagle's narrow approach to aggregating endangered
species and arguing that interdependence of endangered species and deference to
congressional findings justifies aggregation of all endangered species); but see Nagle,
supra note 8, at 180, 192-204 (discussing aggregation problem relating to Endangered
Species Act and arguing it is inappropriate in light of Lopez to aggregate often
dissimilar endangered species).
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regulate general land use or wildlife preservation[.]".5  The
number of endangered and threatened species is limited, and
the government must review its listing decisions every five
years to determine if a species is still endangered."
Additionally, as soon as a species recovers sufficiently so that
its survival is no longer endangered or threatened, the federal
government may no longer regulate those animals and must
recognize exclusive state authority unless an animal enters
federal lands.' 7 Accordingly, the ESA is consistent with Lopez's
broad rationale that congressional legislation must have some
limit under the Commerce Clause.
Moreover, from a federalist perspective, both the Fourth
Circuit in Gibbs and Fifth Circuit in GDF agreed that the
ESA's regulatory scheme does not interfere with a traditional
area of state regulation because regulating endangered species
is a concurrent area of shared responsibility and a subject of
national interest."' The ESA specifically seeks to avoid
interfering with state programs protecting endangered species
by requiring the Secretary of Interior to first review "those
efforts, if any, being made by any State . . . to protect such
species" before including a species on the national list of
... See GDF, 326 F.3d at 640 (discussing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564) ("We rejected these ... arguments because they would
permit Congress to 'regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead
to violent crime ... .)).
456 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2)(A), (B) (2000) (requiring Secretary of Interior to
review listed endangered or threatened species at least once every five years).
411 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2000) (defining "conservation" as "the use of all
methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this
chapter are no longer necessary"); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 502-03; Mank, supra note 3, at
780-81.
41 GDF, 326 F.3d at 639; see also Rancho Viejo LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062,1078-80 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (determining ESA's regulation of endangered species is
subject of national concern and not traditional state regulation); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214
F.3d 483, 499-505 (4th Cir. 2000) (same); see generally Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999) (stating "although States have important
interests in regulating wildlife and natural resources within their borders, this
authority is shared with the Federal Government when the Federal Government
exercises one of its enumerated constitutional powers"); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.322, 326, 329, 335 (1979) (holding states do not own the wildlife within their borders
and federal government has concurrent authority over wildlife under Congress's
commerce power) (overruling Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896)); Mank, supra
note 3, at 770-82 (arguing Gibbs is consistent with Lopez, Morrison and SWANCC
because ESA appropriately regulates endangered species, which are subject of national
concern and not traditional state regulation); see generally Schapiro & Buzbee, supra
note 3, at 1224 (stating '[tihe states and federal government now enjoy extensive areas
of jurisdictional overlap").
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endangered or threatened species." Additionally, the ESA
encourages the Secretary to enter into cooperative agreements
with states that have adequate programs for conserving
threatened and endangered species, as well as providing
financial assistance for such programs."
Furthermore, the ESA does not infringe on an area of
traditional state land use regulation. In 1979, the Supreme
Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma"1 overruled its 1896 decision,
Geer v. Connecticut, which held that states own the wildlife in
their borders. ' The Hughes Court held that states do not own
the wildlife within their borders and that state laws regulating
wildlife are limited by Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause." The Hughes decision recognized that
states have a legitimate role in regulating wildlife within their
borders, but concluded that the federal government has
concurrent authority with states over wildlife that affects
interstate commerce.
There are strong arguments that the federal
government should play a greater role than states in protecting
endangered species because uniform national regulation is
more effective and there is no long history of state regulation in
this area. Beginning with the Lacey Act in 1900,45 the federal
government has played a greater role than the states in
preserving threatened or endangered species." Most states
have not traditionally regulated or protected threatened or
endangered species. 17 Indeed, the lack of effective state
419 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000); Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 503 (discussing 16
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000)); Mank, supra note 3, at 781 (same).
'60 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c),(d) (2000); Mank, supra note 3, at 781 (discussing
cooperative programs between states and federal government to protect endangered
species).
461 441 U.S. 322, 329 (1979).
462 161 U.S. 519 (1896) (upholding Connecticut statute prohibiting interstate
transportation of game birds that had been killed within state).
463 See Mank, supra note 3, at 774; Doremus, supra note 50, at 287-88; White,
supra note 3, at 248-49.
464 See Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335-36; Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 499 (4th
Cir. 2000) (interpreting Hughes as giving federal government concurrent authority
with states over wildlife, especially endangered species); Mank, supra note 3, at 774
(same); White, supra note 3, at 249 (same).
46 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
466 See Mank, supra note 3, at 773-76 (arguing federal government has played
leading role in protecting endangered species); White, supra note 3, at 250-52 (arguing
federal government has greater expertise in protecting endangered species).
467 See Mank, supra note 3, at 776 (arguing states have not traditionally
protected endangered species); White, supra note 3, at 250-51 (arguing state regulation
of endangered species is inadequate).
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protection and the need for uniform national legislation led
Congress to enact the ESA in 1973. 4' By contrast, a federal
statute purporting to regulate all species on non-federal lands
would pose substantial issues under Lopez and Morrison.46'
Additionally, because many states lack effective programs to
protect endangered species, 470 aggregating all endangered
species comports with Hodel's principle that the federal
government may regulate intrastate natural resources where
there is significant under-regulation by states.471
While this Article would prefer that the Court return to
the more deferential approach used from 1937 until 1995, it
concludes that GDF is more consistent with the Court's
current, though flawed, Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In
light of Lopez and Morrison's essential reasoning that
congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause must
have a limited scope, the Supreme Court should adopt the
reasoning in GDF and reject the analysis in Viejo. A broad
reading of the commercial activities rationale in Viejo would
potentially allow the federal government to regulate a virtually
unlimited number of intrastate activities as long as they are
indirectly connected to a commercial actor, even if those
activities have been traditionally regulated by state and local
governments. By contrast, the GDF court's conclusion that the
Department of Interior may aggregate all endangered and
threatened species to justify its regulation of any given species
comports with the Supreme Court's recent decisions because
such regulation is limited to only those listed species, many of
which are commercially valuable and interconnected with
many others, and the goal of the regulation is to return all
species to state control as soon as they achieve recovery.47
46' The ESA's legislative history justified federal regulation of endangered and
threatened species based on the need for uniform, national standards: "[P]rotection of
endangered species is not a matter that can be handled in absence of coherent national
and international policies; the results of a series of unconnected and disorganized
polices and programs by various states might well be confusion compounded." See H.R.
Rep. 93-415, at 5 (1973); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 501-02 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating
"[a] desire for uniform standards also spurred enactment of the ESA"); Mank, supra
note 3, at 779.
469 Mank, supra note 3, at 780-81.
470 Mank, supra note 3, at 779-80; White, supra note 3, at 250-52.
471 See Mank, supra note 3, at 777-81 (arguing federal regulation of
endangered species is consistent with Hodel's rationale that federal government may
regulate intrastate activities if there is a serious failure by state regulators to do so);
supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
472 See supra notes 432, 457 and accompanying text.

